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Introduction
In January, 1983, the Namibian Bar Council1 wrote a letter to the
Namibian Administrator-General, the head of South Africa's occupation
regime in Namibia, urging him to create a judicial commission of in-
quiry. The purpose of such a commission was to investigate the security
legislation in effect in the Territory and the alleged abuses in the applica-
tion of that legislation.2 Given the political situation in Namibia, the
request was daring and unprecedented. In South Africa, a call for a
commission of inquiry is not ordinarily a party-political gesture. Rather,
such a call indicates serious dissatisfaction with some aspect of the state's
financial, administrative, or judicial affairs. By its request, the Namibian
Bar Council was questioning not just the territorial administration, but
the South African regime that ruled Namibia against the will of its in-
habitants and in defiance of international law.3 It was seeking, further-
more, a probe of the elements by which the South African government
maintained its control.
The Bar Council's request elicited no response for eight months. Fi-
nally, in August, 1983, in response to a second request, the Administra-
tor-General issued Proclamation AG 159 of 19[3, which created a
commission of inquiry. The Bar Council complained that the Commis-
sion's terms of reference were too restrictive and that the Proclamation
t Because the proper name for South West Africa is now Namibia, see infra note 5, the
Bar Council will be referred to throughout this Article as the Namibian Bar Council.
tt Member of the New York Bar; Senior Political Affairs Officer, Office of the UN Com-
missioner for Namibia, 1976-81.
1. The elected executive body of the territorial Society of Advocates. See infra notes 88-91
and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 30, 54-65 and accompanying text.
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failed in almost every respect to address the basic problems the Bar
Council had outlined in January. After a series of letters, sometimes
quite acrimonious, resulted in some official "assurances" that these defi-
ciencies would be addressed, the Bar Council reluctantly agreed to sub-
mit a memorandum setting out its views and recommendations to the
Commission.
The Memorandum of the Namibian Bar Council is an extraordinary
document. It portrays daily life under a repressive regime as viewed by
the members of a bar who are trying by every legitimate means to vindi-
cate the virtually non-existent rights of political opponents and of af-
fected non-political bystanders. The Memorandum discusses in detail
twelve cases, all resolved before its submission,4 along with certain ques-
tions that they raise. The discussion encompasses events and actions that
were common knowledge among local lawyers but that could not be in-
troduced in judicial proceedings, even when the accused had their day in
court. Despite the obvious restraints placed on the authors, who are crit-
ical of an occupation regime and yet at the same time must work within
the legal and political insitutions of the regime, the Memorandum pro-
vides insights that no academic study can. The Memorandum is set out
below, following some background information on Namibia and a short
note about the editing of the document. Following the Memorandum is
an Addendum that comments on some aspects of the Memorandum.
A. General Background
Namibia, a largely desert and semi-desert area, is bounded by Angola
and Zambia on the north, by Botswana and South Africa on the east, by
South Africa on the south, and by the Atlantic Ocean on the west. As
large as Texas and Oklahoma combined, the Territory is rich in valuable
minerals, including diamonds, uranium, and copper. Its estimated popu-
lation is between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000. Most live in the northern
third of the country, particularly in the north-central Ovambo area,
where it is possible to raise dry-area grains in years of average rainfall.
Most of the 75,000 whites live in the capital, Windhoek, in the mining
communities, and in the central plateau, where cattle and karakul sheep
grazing is predominant.
4. Three of the cases, U. Kakuva and Another, see infra text accompanying note 129,
Paulus and P. Matheus, see infra text accompanying note 144, and Kruger and van der Heever,
see infra text accompanying note 152, were on appeal when the Memorandum was drafted.
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The colonial occupation of Namibia (formerly named South West Af-
rica)5 began in 1878, when the Territory's only deepwater port, Walvis
Bay,6 was annexed by the British as part of the Cape Colony.7 Six years
later, Imperial Germany claimed the remainder of the Territory as a
protectorate.8
In 1915, the Union of South Africa occupied German South West Af-
rica on behalf of the Allies.9 However, at the end of World War I, Preto-
ria was not allowed to annex the Territory as it had been promised
during the conflict. Instead, Namibia was designated a League of Na-
tions mandated territory, with South Africa as mandatory. 10 The Union
was granted "full power of administration and legislation over the
5. The name was changed to Namibia by the UN General Assembly. G.A. Res. 2372, 22
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16A) at 1, U.N. Doe. A/7088 (1968).
6. The area annexed was approximately 434 square miles and was referred to in
contemporary documents as the "port or settlement" of Walvis Bay. See, eg., British Procla-
mation, 69 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1177 (1877-78) (proclamation "taking posses-
sion of the Port or Settlement of Walfisch Bay," Mar. 12, 1878).
7. 69 British Letters Patent, 70 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 495 (1878-79) (An-
nexation to the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope of the Port or Settlement of Walfisch Bay,
Dec. 14,1878).
8. I. GOLBLA-TT, HISTORY OF SouTH WEST AFRICA 84-98 (1971); see generally W.
AYDELOTrE, BISMARCK AND BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY (1937).
9. Walvis Bay and its Namibian hinterland were brought under a common martial law
before the War ended. (Union) Proc. No. 12 of 1915. In 1922, full administrative and judicial
amalgamation was effected. South West Africa Affairs Act, No. 24 of 1922; Proc. No. 145 of
1922. When white Namibians received limited home rule in 1925, adult white males in Walvis
Bay could vote for representatives to the territorial Legislative Assembly, but were not repre-
sented in the South African Parliament. See infra note 69.
In 1977, Pretoria took a pre-emptive step to limit the economic independence of any future
Namibian government by detaching Walvis Bay from the unified administration of the entire
Territory and claiming it as part of the Republic. Proc. No. R. 202 of 1977. The significance
of removing Walvis Bay from Namibian jurisdiction can be seen in the observation concerning
Walvis Bay that Calvert, an ardent British South African, originally penned while Union
troops were occupying Namibia:
mhe fact must not be forgotten that the natural harbour of Walfisch Bay possesses a
geographical and political importance which can scarcely be over-rated. In Keane's His-
tory of Africa we read: "It gives direct access to the two great water-courses, Tsoakhub
and Kuiseb, which here converge from the north-east and south-east; it is thus practically
the only natural outlet for a region some 400,000 square miles stretching from the sea-
board inland to Zambesia, and from Angola southwards to the Cape. The whole of this
region is at the mercy of the political masters of Walfisch Bay, which in the hands of an
alien Power might serve as a convenient base of operations directed against the British
possessions between the Zambesi and Orange Rivers . . . .If Germany cannot retain
profitable possession of her. . .South-West African Protectorate without Walfisch Bay,
she must abandon it, for Great Britain cannot certainly afford to abandon Walfisch
Bay . . .. "
A. CALVERT, SOUTH-WEST AFRICA 4-5 (1969) (originally published 1915).
10. The Mandate was formally "conferred upon His Britannic Majesty to be exercised on
his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa. . . ." The Mandate for South
West Africa, Dec. 17, 1920, Preamble. The Mandate and many other official documents dating
between 1920 and 1972 are reprinted in the invaluable text of J. DUGARD, THE SOUTH WEST
AFRICA/NAMIBIA DISPUTE (1973).
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territory .. .as an integral portion of the Union of South Africa
. ...-11 The Mandate 12 tempered this broad grant of power by a series
of specific prohibitions and requirements. 13 It also required League ap-
proval for any modification of the Mandate14 and recorded South Af-
rica's agreement to submit disputes over interpretation or application of
the Mandate to the Permanent Court of International Justice.' 5 The
Mandate further specified that the "Mandatory shall promote to the ut-
most the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the
inhabitants of the Territory .... ,,16
Despite the Mandatory's clear obligation to protect the welfare of all
Namibians, South African administration of the Territory consistently
favored white settlers over indigenous blacks. South Africa was severely
criticized throughout the Mandate period for virtually every aspect of its
administration, but particularly for its persistent attempts to assert its
sovereignty over Namibia.17 At the first session of the UN General As-
sembly, Pretoria requested authorization to incorporate Namibia as a
11. See id art. 2.
12. The agreement between the League and the Union is hereinafter referred to as the
Mandate.
13. Specifically, it prohibited the slave trade, forced labor, and the supplying of liquor to
"natives," id. art. 3, as well as the military training of "natives" and the establishment of
military or naval bases or fortifications in the territory, id. art. 4. It required the Mandatory to
control the traffic in arms, id. art. 3, to ensure freedom of conscience, the free excercise of all
forms of worship, and the presence of missionaries, id. art. 5, and make annual reports to the
"satisfacton" of the League Council providing "full information with regard to the territory,"
i d art. 6.
14. Id art. 7.
15. Id.
16. Id art. 2.
17. For example, Pretoria vested control over Namibian railways and harbors in the Gov-
ernor-General of the Union of South Africa. South West Africa Railways and Harbours Act,
No. 20 of 1922. When the Permanent Mandates Commission, the League body supervising
mandatory administration, questioned this action, the Union representative explained that the
best way to run Namibian railways and harbors was "as part of the system of railways and
harbours which exist in the Union;" therefore, Namibian railways and harbors were vested "in
the authority which owns the Union system, .... the Governor-General .... " He added
that:
full ownership can from the terms of the Treaty [of Versailles] and the mandate only last
while the railways and harbours are being worked as part of the combined system. If at
any time the combined system should be abolished or the mandate revoked Act 20 of 1922
would cease to operate.
6 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1048 (1925) (emphasis added). This qualification was incorpo-
rated into the South West Africa Railways and Harbours (Amendment) Act, No. 9 of 1930.
This "ancient" Namibian history is relevant today, as the South African government has
threatened to close down several "unprofitable" branch railway lines in Namibia and to re-
move the track from the closed lines, apparently to take it to South Africa. Windhoek Ob-
server, June 30, 1984; Aug. 4, 1984, at 23, col. 4; Aug. 10, 1984, at 3; Aug. 17, 1984, at 11
[certain page and column numbers from Namibian newspapers unavailable; copies of articles
on file with the annotator].
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fifth province in the Union. 8 The Assembly refused, requesting South
Africa to place the Territory under the UN's trusteeship system.19 When
South Africa refused this request in 1947,20 the present conflict began.
Upon the ascendancy of the hardline National Party to power in South
Africa in 1948, any hopes of a peaceable resolution of the conflict were
dashed. Pretoria refused to honor its obligation under the Mandate to
submit annual reports on its administration of the Territory2' to the Gen-
eral Assembly, the successor to the League Council.22 Over the objec-
tions of the UN, South Africa extended its system of apartheid, and
subsequently the system of ethnic "bantustans" or "homelands", to
Namibia,23 and then began a process of de facto annexation. 24 Between
1946 and 1966, the UN, increasingly frustrated, attempted negotiation,
confrontation, cajolery, and appeals to the World Court to resolve the
dispute.25 Nothing could induce Pretoria to recognize the UN's right to
supervise South Africa's administration of the Territory.
18. Statement by the Union of South Africa, 1 U.N. GAOR C. 4 Part 3 (Agenda Item 29)
(Nov. 27, 1946), at 45, U.N. Doe. A/123 (1946).
19. G.A. Res. 65, U.N. Doc. A/65 (1946).
20. Communication from the Government of the Union of South Africa, 2 U.N. GAOR
C. 4 Annex 3a, at 133, 134-35, U.N. Doc. A/334 (1947).
21. In 1950, the International Court of Justice advised the General Assembly that as long
as Namibia was not placed under the Trusteeship System, it remained a territory under "inter-
national mandate"; that the "supervisory functions" of the League Council should be exercised
by the United Nations; and that South Africa could not unilaterally change the international
status of Namibia. International Status of South West Africa, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 143 (Advisory
Opinion of July 11).
22. Mandate, supra note 10, art. 6.
23. The blueprint for "separate development" (apartheid) in Namibia is found in the RE-
PORT OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO SOUTH-WEST AFRICAN AFFAIRS, 1962-1963,
R.P. 12 of 1964, referred to as the "Odendaal Report" (or "Plan"), from the name of the
Commission chairman. The major legislation implementing the Report as to racial matters
was the "Native Nations Act," officially referred to as the Development of Self-Government
for Native Nations in South-West Africa Act, No. 54 of 1968.
24. South Africa granted representation in Parliament to white Namibians. South-West
Africa Affairs Amendment Act, No. 23 of 1949, §§ 27-31. It also imposed involuntary South
African citizenship on most Africans born in Namibia (whites already were citizens). South
African Citizenship Act, No. 44 of 1949, §§ 2, 3, 5(1). Finally, it transferred control of "native
affairs" from Windhoek to Pretoria (to the then-Minister of Native Affairs, now the Minister
of Cooperation and Development) and vested all "native reserves" and funds connected there-
with in the South African Development Trust (of which the South African State President is
the sole trustee). South-West Africa Native [now Bantu] Affairs Administration Act, No. 56
of 1954, § 4.
25. See International Status of South West Africa, supra note 21; South West Africa-
Voting Procedure, 1956 I.C.J. 67 (Advisory Opinion of June 7, 1955); Admissibility of Hear-
ings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa, 1956 I.C.J. 23 (Advisory Opinion
of June 1).
In 1960, at the urging of the General Assembly, Ethiopia and Liberia instituted a proceeding
in the World Court under Article 7, paragraph 2 of the Mandate, in which the Union had
consented to the Court's jurisdiction. Elaborating on the complaints that the General Assem-
bly had been unable to resolve, the applicants asked for a ruling on alleged violations of Man-
date obligations and appropriate relief. However, after having overruled South Africa's
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In October 1966, when all other recourse appeared to have been ex-
hausted, the General Assembly took the unprecedented step of citing
Pretoria's violations of its Mandate obligations as an effective repudiation
of the contract of mandate.2 6 The Assembly revoked the Mandate, called
for an end to South Africa's occupation, and undertook to administer
Namibia until independence.2 7 A few months later, it created the UN
Council for Namibia to act for it in the interim.2 8 South Africa did not,
however, withdraw from Namibia. Consequently, Namibia was left an
international territory legally under UN administration, but illegally oc-
cupied by the Republic2 9 of South Africa.30 This situation continues to-
day. After revocation of the Mandate, new negotiations were undertaken
between the UN and Pretoria, aimed this time at getting South Africa
out of Namibia. Yet these negotiations were as fruitless as the earlier
ones.
In 1976, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 385, calling for
South African withdrawal from Namibia and for an election that the UN
would "supervise and control. ' ' 31 When South Africa stalled 32 and the
objections to its jurisdiction in 1962, the Court in 1966 refused to decide the substantive issues
on the ground that the applicants had no legal right or interest in a dispute over administration
of the Territory. South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319
(Judgment of Dec. 21); South West Africa Cases, (Eth. v. S. Afr., Liberia v. S. Afr.), 1966
I.C.J. 4 (Second Phase Judgment of July 18).
26. The Mandate's status as a contract, a mere statement of desire, or something else, was
a hotly debated question over the years. The World Court accepted the concept of obligation
inherent in a contract. In its 1962 judgment, supra note 25, the Court characterized the Man-
date as "a special type of instrument composite in nature and instituting a novel international
regime. It incorporates a definite agreement .. " Id. at 331. The Mandate, "in fact and in
law, is an international agreement having the character of a treaty or convention." Id. at 330.
27. G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 2, U.N. Doe. A/6316 (1966).
28. G.A. Res. 2248, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at 1, U.N. Doe. A/6657 (1967).
29. The Union of South Africa became the Republic of South Africa in 1961. South Africa
Constitution Act, No. 32 of 1961.
30. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16
(Advisory Opinion of June 21). See also J. DUGARD, supra note 11, at 447-501.
31. S.C. Res. 385, 31 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decis., at 8, U.N. Doe. S/INF/32 (1976). The
phrase "supervise and control" was negotiated with great care and deliberation to ensure that
the UN would run the election-not merely oversee it. Conversation with the UN Commis-
sioner on Namibia during service as Senior Political Affairs Officer, January, 1976 (notes on
file with the annotator).
32. A few days before the Resolution's August 1976 deadline for acceptance by South
Africa of its terms, the South African-created, ethnically based "Turnhalle Conference"-so
named for the Windhoek turnhalle (German for "gymnasium/drill hall") where it met-issued
a short statement to the effect that conference members were working on a constitution and
hoped for independence within three years. The Western members of the Security Council
indicated that in light of this "step forward" they would veto any proposal calling for sanc-
tions for failure to comply with the Council's directive.
Less than a year later, the Turnhalle Conference did produce a draft constitution, but it was
such a farce that not even apologists for Pretoria considered it acceptable. A few minor subse-
quent changes made to try to win international support were enough, however, to split the
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African states called for sanctions, France, the United Kingdom, and the
United States (the Western permanent members of the Security Council),
in conjunction with Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany (the
elected Western members of the Security Council at that time), formed
the "Contact Group" to take control of the situation. Early in 1978, the
Contact Group made a proposal that was later incorporated in Security
Council Resolution 435.33 The proposal provided for withdrawal of all
South African troops, save for 1,500 confined to base in Namibia, but
allowed the entire South African civil administration, including the
South African police, to remain in place and to run the election under
UN monitoring.34 This proposal was accepted by South Africa,35 as well
as by the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO), 36 which by
then had been recognized by the General Assembly as the "sole and au-
thentic" representative of the Namibian people. 37 The United Nations
Secretary-General appointed a Special Representative to head the UN
monitoring force.38
Conference's white delegates. The anti-change faction drove the pro-change whites out of the
Territory's National Party, thus setting that Party in opposition to its parent South African
National Party, which was seeking international acceptance of an arrangement that would
allow South Africa to control the territory behind the scenes. Pro-change whites formed the
Republican Party and, with South African support, an umbrella grouping, the Democratic
Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), composed of all the ethnic groups (except the anti-change whites)
at the Conference. DTA candidates won the 1978 South African-run elections. See infra note
34.
33. 33 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June 1978) at 17, U.N. Doc. S/12636 (1978). See also S.C.
Res. 435, 33 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decis., at 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34 (1978).
34. Although held out as being in accordance with resolution 385, the Western Plan/
resolution 435 in fact undercut every major provision of the earlier resolution: (i) Instead
of being required to withdraw immediately, the South African occupation regime would
remain in Namibia and run it until independence. (ii) Pretoria was not required to dis-
mantle the bantustans, and other human rights requirements were omitted or made less
comprehensive. (iii) The election would be run by South African officials-they would
choose the electoral system, register voters, provide ballot boxes, count the votes, etc.-
while the UN would be reduced to merely monitoring their conduct. And, (iv) the re-
moval of Walvis Bay from Namibian jurisdiction was tacitly approved ....
E. LANDIs, NAMIBIAN LIBERATION: SELF-DETERMINATION, LAW AND POLITIcs 7 (Episco-
pal Churchpeople for a Free Southern Africa, New York 1982).
35. 33 U.N. SCOR Supp. (Apr.-June 1978) at 40, U.N. Doc. A/S-9/12-s/12567 (1978)
(letter from South African foreign affairs minister to the U.N. Secretary-General).
36. 33 U.N. SCOR Supp. (July-Sept. 1978) at 6, U.N. Doc. S/12775 (1978) (communique
issued by Contact Group and SWAPO).
37. G.A. Res. 31/152, 31(I) U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 130, para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/146
(1976). In paragraph 3, G.A. Res. 152 granted SWAPO observer status at the U.N. Id. at 136.
38. As authorized by S.C. Res. 431, 33 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decis., at 12, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/34 (1978).
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A few months later, South Africa reneged on its agreement.39 Instead,
it ran its own election 4° to choose "national leaders," who were then used
by Pretoria as a "puppet" administration41 which ultimately collapsed in
disrepute.42 Subsequent negotiations between South Africa and the Con-
tact Group resulted in some concessions, gained at the expense of
SWAPO. 43 These concessions were never enough, however, to persuade
South Africa to agree to an election under Resolution 435.
In 1979, South African troops invaded Angola and occupied its south-
ern tier in an attempt to destabilize the Luanda government, or at least to
force it to interdict SWAPO in the area.44 An agreement negotiated in
early 1984 provided for South African withdrawal within three
months.45 While such a withdrawal was ostensibly completed in mid-
1985,46 local people say that South African troops still remain.47
39. Technically, South Africa has never rejected Resolution 435. But when the Secretary-
General issued his report on the implementation of the Resolution, 33 U.N. SCOR Supp.
(July-Sept. 1978) at 33, U.N. Doc. S/12827 (1978), which was based on an on-site survey by
his Special Representative, Pretoria found fault with nearly every item. 33 U.N. SCOR Supp.
(July-Sept. 1978), at 38, U.N. Doc. S/12836 (1978).
40. The election was held in December 1978. See Proc. AG 63 of 1978 (the "Election
Proclamation"). Election results are discussed in Wash. Post, Dec. 16, 1978, at A24, col. 1.
Security Council Resolution 439, 33 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decis., at 14, U.N. Doc. S/INF/34
(1978), condemned South Africa for proposing such an election, declared such an election and
its results "null and void," and stated that no recognition would be given by the UN or its
members to "any representatives or organ established by that process."
41. Procs. A-G 21 of 1979 and 19 of 1980 transformed the elected representatives into a
"National Assembly" and created a "Council of Ministers."
42. Times (London), Jan. 19, 1983, at 9, col. 3. INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE & AID FUND
FOR SouTH AFRICA, Jan.-Feb. 1983, at I [hereinafter cited as IDAF Focus]; IDAF Focus,
Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 10.
43. For example, it was agreed that SWAPO soldiers would not be based in Namibia dur-
ing the electoral process, Military Deployment Plan for UNTAG, item 7(e), 34 U.N. SCOR
Supp. (Jan.-Mar. 1979) at 149, 154, U.N. Doc. S/13172 (1979), although the original under-
standing was that they would be confined to bases in the Territory under the same circum-
stances as the 1500 South African troops remaining after the withdrawal of the rest of
Pretoria's army. It was also agreed, inter alia, that certain provisions specified by the United
States after consultation with Pretoria would be written into the future constitution of
Namibia, even though the election to be held under Resolution 435 was intended to choose
members of a "constituent assembly" who would draft a constitution in accordance with the
wishes of their electorate.
44. M. HOLNESS, APARTHEID'S WAR AGAINST ANGOLA 6-7 (1983) (published by U.N.
Centre Against Apartheid and World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration
with South Africa); Angola: Engaging the Clutch, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 30, 1985, at 18, 19-
22.
45. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1984, at A4, col. 3; Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1984, at Al, col. 1.
46. Guardian (U.K.), Nov. 21, 1985, at 9, col. 1; Guardian (U.K.), Dec. 16, 1985, at 8,
col. 1.
47. Guardian (U.K.) Nov. 21, 1985, at 9, col. 1; IDAF Focus, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 11;
RESISTER, Oct./Nov. 1985, at 19.
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Meanwhile, the United States has taken over the negotiations begun by
the Contact Group, shuttling diplomats between Luanda and Pretoria,48
and periodically announcing progress towards a settlement based on Res-
olution 435.49 Despite these efforts, South Africa continues to evade any
specific commitment to an internationally supervised election. Many ob-
servers believe that South Africa fears that its administration of Namibia
would be overwhelmingly discredited.50 Rather than moving towards a
political resolution of this conflict, South Africa continues to build up its
military presence in the Territory.51 In addition, during June 1985, in an
effort to put a good face on its continuing occupation, South Africa in-
stalled a new Namibian "interim government, ' ' 52 with which it may ulti-
mately reach an internal settlement that would exclude the entire
international community.5 3
B. Resistance to South African Occupation
Namibians have a history of bloody but unsuccessful revolts against
their colonial masters.5 4 Undeterred by this history, Namibians began
armed resistance anew in the mid-1960's when SWAPO, alone among the
liberation movements, decided to use force, in addition to diplomatic and
political means, in order to liberate the Territory. The first guerrilla
fighters were soon arrested, detained, and tortured. They were then tried
in Pretoria, not Namibia,5 5 under the subsequently enacted Terrorism
48. As the Memorandum was being annotated, American negotiators were again engaging
in discussions with Angolan officials. N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1985, at A3, col. 3.
49. "[W]henever there is pressure by the majority of the members of the United Nations
on the West, progress in the negotiations is always reported. . . ." G. ROCHA, IN SEARCH
OF NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE: THE LIMITATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 134 (1984).
50. Ivan Himmelhoch, a South African intelligence agent who later fled the country, has
revealed that his agency had informed the government that in a democratic election at least
83% of all Namibians would support SWAPO. Foreign Policy Duality, NEW STATESMAN,
Aug. 22, 1980, at 12. Since that time, SWAPO has come to an understanding with several
political parties in Namibia and has thereby increased its support.
51. Windhoek Observer, Jan. 26, 1985 (completion of largest military exercise ever held in
Namibia); UN Council for Namibia Press Release NAM/807, Feb. 1, 1985; Guardian (U.K.),
Nov. 21, 1985, at 9, col. 1.
52. South West Africa Legislative and Executive Authority Establishment Proclamation,
No. R. 101 of 1985 (issued by the South African State President).
53. AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, Apr. 24, 1985; Press release 10/85, June 17, 1985, of the
Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, at 6 (speech by South African State
President Botha to the new National Assembly installed in Namibia).
54. Hereros and Namas rebelled against the Germans in the first decade of this century.
Bondelswarts Namas, the Basters of the Rehoboth Gebiet, and the Ovambos rebelled during
the first decade of South African administration of the Mandate. See generally J. DUGARD,
supra note 10.
55. State v. Tuhadeleni and Others, 1969 (1) S.A. 153 (S. Afr. App. Div.). For a personal
account of the trial and the events leading up to it by one of the defendants, see J. YA-OTTo,
BATrLEFRONT NAMIBIA 82-136 (1981); for a defense lawyer's perspective, see J. CARLSON,
No NEUTRAL GROUND 150-216 (1973).
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Act, 56 which was made retroactive for five years.57 Nevertheless, resist-
ance spread.
The 1970's witnessed both the increasing strength of SWAPO and the
tenacious efforts of South Africa to retain control. At the end of 1971,
SWAPO mounted a general strike that shut down the Territory for more
than two months.58 The increasing activity of SWAPO's military arm,
the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), forced Pretoria to
counter with military force. Pretoria first sent paramilitary police, and
then army units, to keep control in Namibia.
When Portugal ended its rule over Angola in 1974, PLAN, with hid-
den bases in Angola, became a more serious and immediate threat to
Pretoria's control of its former Mandate. Consequently, South African
troops invaded the former Portuguese colony in an attempt to install a
pro-Western UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola) government in Luanda that would collaborate with Pretoria.5 9
The attempt was finally thrown back with the help of Cuban soldiers.
Yet, South Africa is believed to have at least 100,000 troops in north-
ern Namibia and Angola today.60 This includes the South West Africa
Territorial Force (SWATF), which consists of Namibian draftees and
other local people driven to soldiering by economic necessity. All
Namibian males from age seventeen to age fifty-five are subject to con-
scription by the occupying South African authorities for service against
56. No. 83 of 1967.
57. Id. § 9 (1).
58. J. YA-OTro, supra note 55, at 140-44.
59. J. STOCKWELL, IN SEARCH OF ENEMIES 164-165, 185-187 (1978).
60. Apartheid's Army in Namibia, IDAF Fact Paper on Southern Africa No. 10, at 3
(London 1983) (copy on file with the annotator). This figure apparently includes paramilitary
police and all sorts of special units, including special guards assigned to local dignitaries. Ja
Toivo Calls for Sanctions Against South Africa, SOUTHERN AFR. REP. Dec. 1985, at 11. See
also SWAPO's Nujoma Denies Sanctions Will Harm Blacks, Foreign Broadcast Information
Service [hereinafter cited as FBIS] (Mid. East), Apr. 15, 1985, at U3 (text from Lusaka Radio
Freedom in English to South Africa) (according to Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, there
are over 110,000 South African troops).
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their fellow Namibians in PLAN.61 In addition, South Africa has cre-
ated a number of special police and guard units (including Koevoet, dis-
cussed in the Bar Council's Memorandum) 62 which in effect have a
license to engage in unchecked killing and mayhem.
Unlike the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African
Congress (PAC) in the Republic of South Africa, SWAPO has not been
banned or declared illegal in the Territory, despite the existence of
PLAN. 63 However, special local legislation in effect in Namibia forbids
SWAPO and other opposition groups from holding political meetings. 64
All effective opponents of the regime are repeatedly arrested and held
61. Gen. Notice No. 132 of 1984, Off. Gaz. of South West Africa, No. 4973, Nov. 9, 1984.
See Conscription for All Men in Namibia, Windhoek Advertiser, Oct. 23, 1984, at 1.
In 1983, Eric Binga, a draftee who was a member of SWAPO, brought a proceeding in the
Supreme Court in Windhoek for an order exempting him from national service in either
SWATF or the South African Defence Force (SADF). In his application he alleged that the
South African Parliament had no legal power to make laws for Namibia (conscription is car-
ried out under the authority of the Defence Act, No. 44 of 1957) and further that he had been
wrongfully ordered to undergo military training in Walvis Bay, which was not part of the
mandated territory of South West Africa. The application was denied. However, leave to
appeal was granted. Windhoek Observer, July 21, 1984; Windhoek Advertiser, Sept. 21, 1984.
The appeal had not been decided as of mid-December 1985. Although the applicable provision
of the South African Defence Act relating to conscription, like the General Notice, applied to
white males only, "legality has never been of much consequence to the SADF in Namibia and
it is certain that some way will be found around the problem." REsIsTER, Feb./Mar. 1985, at
9.
62. Memorandum, infra § D.2.2.
63. The Herstigte Nasionale Party (HNP) of Namibia, an all-white right-wing party that
opposes Namibian independence, submitted a memorandum to the Commission of Inquiry in
November 1984. According to the press, that memorandum attacked the "double standards"
applicable to SWAPO. The memorandum complained that SWAPO members were considered
"terrorists" in the "operational area" (northern part of Namibia), while at the same time,
SWAPO was acknowledged internally as a political party, "and its members were even admit-
ted to join the Armed Forces fighting SWAPO's insurgency wing." Windhoek Observer, Nov.
10, 1984. See also infra notes 141 & 159.
The emphasis on the differences between the "legal," albeit continually harassed, SWAPO
political party in Namibia and the SWAPO "in exile," which directs military and diplomatic
action to liberate the Territory, has long been a subject of comment. The Race against Time
and Radicals, To THE POINT, Oct. 15, 1976, at 8; von Lucius & Totemeyer, Namibia: A
Regional Conflict and a World Problem, 30 GERM. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 73, 85-86 (English ed.
1979).
SWAPO headquarters are currently located in Luanda. Between SWAPO congresses, party
policy is set by a Central Committee, most of whose members are outside the Territory.
Some members, however, such as Henrik Witbooi and Nathaniel Maxuilili, live in Namibia.
64. Prohibition and Notification of Meetings Act, No. 22 of 1981, enacted by the "Na-
tional Assembly" that was elected in the South African-run election of December 1978. See
supra note 40. The Act prohibits meetings of any political organization whose constitution
"advocates. . . or is in favour of the overthrow of any government or authority in the terri-
tory or the bringing about of a political. . . change in the territory. . . by forcible means
.... " Prohibition and Notification of Meetings Act § 2 (a)(i). SWAPO is the only Namibian
liberation movement that advocates armed struggle as a means of attaining independence.
All political meetings of more than twenty persons require advance approval of a magistrate.
Right-wing parties ignore this requirement with impunity; members of the SWANU (South
West Africa National Union) executive were charged with meeting without approval, but the
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under legislation authorizing detention without trial.65 Pretoria's fren-
zied attempts to repress the opposition have led to the extensive abuses
which the Bar Council Memorandum details.
C. Laws Applied in Namibia
Although Article 2 of the Mandate empowered the Union of South
Africa to legislate for the Territory "as an integral portion" of South
Africa and to "apply the laws of the Union. . .to the territory, ' 66 South
African legislation has never applied automatically in Namibia. Parlia-
ment has either legislated expressly for the Territory,67 or provided that a
specific law should apply in Namibia.68 Other acts of Parliament have
been applied to Namibia by proclamation of the South African Gover-
nor-General (referred to after 1961 as the State President), or by procla-
mation of the Administrator of South West Africa, Pretoria's governor in
Windhoek prior to 1977. Both the Governor-General (State President)
and the Administrator had power to legislate by proclamation, and the
local Legislative Assembly was empowered to enact laws on a limited
range of matters, subject to South African approval.69
case did not come to trial. Windhoek Advertiser, Jan. 18, 1982; Rand Daily Mail (Johannes-
burg), Jan. 20, 1982, at 4, col. 2.
People attending a barbecue held at a Catholic Church farm near Windhoek to celebrate the
release from prison of SWAPO hero Toivo ja Toivo were arrested and charged under the Act.
The arrests proved politically embarrassing to South Africa, and the charges were dropped
before trial. SWAPO Chiefs Held in Security Raid on Windhoek Party, Guardian (U.K.), June
11, 1984, at 7, col. 1; The Times (London), June 12, 1984, at 7, col. 3. More recently, three
SWAPO officials, including the Acting President Nathaniel Maxuilili, were charged with con-
travening the Act by holding a meeting in Katutura (the segregated African township outside
Windhoek) to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the founding of the movement. The
Namibian, Nov. 22, 1985.
65. The principal measures are the Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967, superseded by the Inter-
nal Security Act, No. 74 of 1982; the Security Districts Proc., infra note 85, referred to in the
Memorandum, §§ E.6 and E.7; and the Preventive Detention Proc., infra note 86, discussed in
the Memorandum, § G.3.1.
66. Mandate, supra note 11, art. 2.
67. E.g., the South West Africa Affairs Act, No. 25 of 1969; the Coloured Persons in
South-West Africa Education Act, No. 63 of 1972.
68. E.g., the Territorial Waters Act, No. 87 of 1963, § 8, reads: "This Act shall apply also
in respect of the territory of South-West Africa."
However, any act of Parliament might provide that another law should apply to the Terri-
tory. In particular, a General Law Amendment Act-one or more laws with such a title are
enacted in each session of Parliament-might apply some of the laws amended by its provi-
sions to the Territory.
69. The powers of the Governor-General (later the State President) and of the Administra-
tor were set out in § 44 of the South-West Africa Constitution Act, No. 42 of 1925, as
amended, which granted limited "home rule" to the whites (originally white males) of the
Territory. For the powers of the Legislative Assembly, see id. §§ 25-30, 32-33.
The South West Africa Constitution Act, No. 39 of 1968, repealed and replaced, but sub-
stantially re-enacted, the 1925 Constitution. However, the South West Africa Affairs Act, No.
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In 1977, in preparation for negotiations with the Contact Group con-
cerning Namibian independence, the South African Parliament yielded
its legislative power to the South African Governor-General, vesting him
with plenary power to rule the Territory by decree.70 Authority to rule is
now exercised by the Administrator-General of South West Africa, to
whom the State President has delegated his plenary power.71 In June
1985, the State President installed in Windhoek a "government of na-
tional unity" with a legislature of sixty-two nominated members. 72 On
paper, this government has power to legislate on a wide range of matters
subject to approval by the Administrator-General. 73 Despite this nomi-
nal independence, Namibians charge that the Administrator-General
calls the tune.
Most South African security laws were enacted after 1948 when the
Nationalists came to power. These laws, which for the most part have
been applied in Namibia as well,74 include the Suppression of Commu-
nism Act (later retitled the Internal Security Act),"5 the Terrorism Act,76
25 of 1969, substantially modified the 1968 Constitution, eliminating most of its "home rule"
provisions and effectively transforming Namibia into a fifth province of the Republic.
70. South West Africa Constitution Amendment Act, No. 95 of 1977 (adding new subsec-
tions (1) and (2) to § 38 of the 1968 South West Africa Constitution Act, No. 39 of 1968).
71. Proc. 181 of 1977.
72. Proc. R. 101 of 1985, supra note 52, § 4 (1)(a).
73. Id. § 3.
74. Among the South African security laws that did not originally apply in Namibia were
the Riotous Assemblies Act, No. 17 of 1956 (applied many years later, however); the "Sabo-
tage Act," General Law Amendment Act, No. 76 of 1962, § 21; and the "90-day detention
law," General Law Amendment Act, No. 37 of 1963, § 17.
75. No. 44 of 1950. This Act, inter alia, empowered the Minister of Justice, without notice
and in his unreviewable discretion: to declare organizations to be unlawful and to disband
them, penalizing members for their adherence prior to the date the organizations were de-
clared illegal; to prohibit publications; to "ban" any person by restricting the person's activi-
ties (job, memberships, etc.), presence in or absence from specified areas (including imposing
house arrest), right to attend "gatherings" (any meeting with two or more other persons), and
the person's right to communicate with other "banned" persons; to require banned persons to
report regularly (daily or weekly) to the police; to prohibit publication of speeches or writings
of a banned person; and to detain persons in prison without trial or sentence. The Internal
Security Act of 1950 was amended and consolidated with other security legislation in 1982.
Internal Security Act, No. 74 of 1982. See also infra note 79 and accompanying text.
76. No. 83 of 1967. Section 2 of the Act created the new crime of "participation in terror-
istic activities" (terrorism), defined very broadly to include any act committed anywhere in the
world if committed with "the intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order." Any
accused person who is shown to have committed such an act is presumed guilty of having
intended "to endanger the maintenance of law and order in the Republic," and is subject to
capital punishment. He or she may rebut this presumption only by showing that the act com-
mitted was not likely to have any of twelve broadly-defined "results," and that he or she did
not intend any of those "results." The "results" listed in § 2(2) include: encouraging the
"achievement of any political aim" or bringing about "any social or economic change" in
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the Official Secrets Act,77 and the Public Safety Act.78 In 1982, a new
consolidated Internal Security Act79 replaced the earlier Internal Secur-
ity Act and the Terrorism Act. In addition, the Protection of Informa-
tion Act80 replaced the Official Secrets Act. Although these 1982 laws
were not made applicable to Namibia, and contained no provision saving
the repealed legislation as to Namibia, Namibian lawyers treat the re-
pealed laws as still in effect in the Territory.81 However, it now appears
that the State President applied the Protection of Information Act and
cooperation with a foreign government or international body; causing injury to anyone; caus-
ing "substantial financial loss;" obstructing traffic; or "embarrass[ing] the administration of
the affairs of State."
Thus, for example, among the acts which could constitute terrorism are cooperating with
the World Health Organization to end chronic malnutrition among Africans, or running an
advertising campaign to persuade housewives to switch from one brand of soap to another.
The Reverend Allan Boesak has been charged for, inter alia, advocating divestment under the
the equivalent provision of the Internal Security Act of 1982, supra note 75. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 21, 1985, at A6, col. 1.
Section 6 of the Act provided for the unreviewable, indefinite detention for interrogation of
any person believed to have information about a terrorist or a past or potential act of terror-
ism. Under the Act, the detained person could be held incommunicado, and the detention was
not subject to judicial review. See also J. CARLSON, supra note 55, at 145-46 (reciting a collo-
quy between himself and a Security Police officer on cross-examination concerning the dura-
tion of detention).
77. No. 16 of 1956. This Act, as amended in 1969, was intended to protect South Africa
against both foreign espionage and embarrassing revelations as to the operations of its intelli-
gence service. It is characterized by undefined terms, by provisions shifting the burden of
proof onto the accused, and by irrebuttable presumptions undercutting the defense of the ac-
cused. It outlaws proximity to any officially proclaimed "prohibited place" and penalizes
breaches of trust as well as the publication, communication, or receipt of prohibited informa-
tion. This Act has been consolidated in the Internal Security Act of 1982, supra note 75.
78. No. 3 of 1953. The Public Safety Act empowers the State President to declare a state
of emergency in South Africa or Namibia and to issue emergency regulations authorizing,
inter a", summary arrest and detention. This Act was the legal basis for the declaration in
the summer of 1985 of a state of emergency in thirty-six magisterial districts in South Africa.
IDAF, Briefing Paper No. 19, Nov. 1985, at 2.
79. No. 74 of 1982. The 1982 Act repeals and replaces substantial parts of various laws
relating to, for example, riotous assemblies, sabotage, and detention without trial. See also
supra notes 75-77.
80. No. 84 of 1982. The Act, similar in many respects to the law it replaces, forbids any-
one from being in a "prohibited place" and from obtaining or disclosing any information af-
fecting state security or "interests." It creates numerous presumptions against an accused
person, who has to establish his or her innocence, and it provides for trials in camera.
81. See A. Lubowski (a Namibian advocate), Speech at Seminar on Namibia, Sponsored
by the South African Institute of Race Relations 12 (Johannesburg, July 2, 1984) (Terrorism
Act still in effect in Namibia) (copy on file with the Yale Journal of International Law). On
December 14, 1984, a Namibian journalist, Gwen Lister, was arrested and charged under the
Official Secrets Act, supra note 77, and the Post Office Act, No. 44 of 1958, for revealing to the
press a confidential police order to the postmaster to intercept her mail; the order had been
erroneously addressed to her and placed in her post office box. The charges against her were
dropped on the day set for trial. N.Y.Times, Dec. 15, 1984, at A5, col. 1; Rand Daily Mail
(Johannesburg), Dec. 15, 1984 at 1, col. 1; Rand Daily Mail (Johannesburg) Dec. 19, 1984, at
2, col. 9; Windhoek Advertiser, Dec. 18, 1984, at 1; Windhoek Advertiser, Jan. 31, 1985, at 1.
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certain other South African legislation to the Territory on the eve of in-
stallation of the new Namibian "government. '82
In addition to the South African security legislation applied in
Namibia and the local law restricting political meetings, 8 3 a series of spe-
cial laws have been promulgated for the Territory to deal with local op-
position to South Africa's unlawful occupation of Namibia. These
include (South African) Proclamation R. 17 of 1972,84 the Security Dis-
tricts Proclamation of 1977 (popularly known as "AG 9" or "Proclama-
tion 9"1),85 and the Preventive Detention Proclamation of 1978.86
Proclamation 9, like Proclamation R. 17, which it repealed and replaced,
subjects most of the Territory to full or modified martial law.87
82. REsISTER, Aug./Sept. 1985, at 9.
83. See supra note 64.
84. Proc. R. 17 of 1972.
85. No. AG 9 of 1977. The "AG" indicates that it was issued by the Administrator-
General rather than by the South African State President. It is referred to in the Memoran-
dum § Epassim. The Proclamation (repeatedly amended) empowers the Administrator-Gen-
eral or his deputy to declare "security districts" (areas of full or modified martial law); it
prohibits public meetings without official permission; and it empowers security forces in the
district to search and seize without warrants, to arrest any persons there, and, as amended by
Procs. AG 23 and AG 27 of 1979, to detain them incommunicado for interrogation for a
period of 30 days, which may be extended indefinitely by the Administrator-General. As to
detention under the proclamation, see infra Memorandum § E. 2 (the Kakuva case); Lubow-
ski, supra note 81, at 9. The Proclamation also empowers the Administrator-General to de-
clare "prohibited areas" ("no-go" zones) along the Namibian border, from which all civilians
are removed. Proc. AG 9, § 3. They may be shot on sight in such areas for violating the night
curfew. IDAF Focus, Mar.-Apr. 1985, at 9; see also Repression and Resistance in Namibia,
IDAF Briefing Paper No. 14, Nov. 1984, at 1.
The Proclamation grants full immunity against any civil suit "in respect of a cause of action
arising out of or in connection with the operation of the Proclamation." Proc. AG 9, § 8(1).
Immunity from criminal prosecution is granted for all actions taken or omitted "in good faith"
under the Proclamation. Id. § 8(2)(b).
86. Detention for the Prevention of Political Violence and Intimidation Proclamation,
Proclamation AG 26 of 1978 (commonly referred to as "AG 26"). It empowers the Adminis-
trator-General to order the arrest and detention, for as long as he deems it desirable, id. §
3(3), of persons who may obstruct or hinder "peaceful and orderly constitutional develop-
ment" in Namibia through violence or intimidation. Id. §§ 2(l)(a), (2)(b). This Proclamation
was issued and first used to detain the entire SWAPO leadership at the time when South Africa
was apparently agreeing to a UN-monitored election in Namibia, as proposed by the Contact
Group. See supra note 35. It is discussed briefly in the Memorandum, infra § G.3.1,
87. Full martial law applies in the Kaokoveld ("Kaokoland"), Ovamboland, Kavango,
Caprivi, and since March, 1985, in Bushmanland and Hereroland East as well. Govt. Notice
AG No. 28 of 1985, S.W.A. Off. Gazette 5012 (Mar. 11, 1985). Modified martial law extends
as far south as the Windhoek magisterial district in the center of the Territory. Full or modi-
fied martial law applies to more than 50% of the Territory's habitable land area and to some
80% of the Namibian population.
In addition to complying with the provisions of AG 9, residents of the areas to which full
martial law applies are required to obtain a police permit to enter the area, and they must be
accompanied by a police escort when they travel there. H. Angula, The Effect of Security
Legislation upon the Lives of People in Namibia 7 (paper presented by Namibian attorney to
Seminar on Legal Aspects of Apartheid, held in Washington, D. C. July 6-7, 1985, co-spon-
sored by the Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law
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D. The Namibian Bar
Namibia, like England, has a divided bar. "Advocates" are generally
equivalent to barristers, and "attorneys" to solicitors. Each group has its
own territory-wide professional organization. However, Namibian law-
yers are concentrated in Windhoek, the only city of substantial size and
the seat of both the territorial government and the white ethnic govern-
ment. 88
The northern part of Namibia, where well over half the population
lives, is reported to have no lawyers in private practice.89 The people are
poor and black; they are scattered in tiny hamlets and isolated kraals
over a vast area; and the entire area is under full martial law, making the
practice of any profession extremely difficult and dangerous. 90 Both the
"Bar" (advocates) and the "Side Bar" (attorneys) are predominantly
white, although there is no formal barrier to the admission of blacks.91
In fact, only one African lawyer is employed by a Namibian law firm.
The Namibian Bar Council is the elected executive body of the Society of
Advocates.
E. The Commission of Inquiry
A series of letters between the Bar Council on the one hand, and the
Administrator-General and officials of the Commission on the other, is
annexed to the Council's Memorandum and constitutes the body of sec-
tions A and B of the Memorandum. The first letter, dated January 25,
1983, urgently requested the Administrator-General to appoint a judicial
commission to consider the problems of abuse by the Security Forces,
such as deaths in detention facilities and other malpractices relating to
and the Section on Individual Rights and Responsibilities and the Standing Committee on
World Order under Law, both of the American Bar Association). These permits are not
granted routinely. Gwen Lister, editor-in-chief of The Namibian, has been refused a permit
despite its importance for her work. Reuters dispatch, March 15, 1985.
88. Ethnic "homelands" were formally established for Africans by the Native Nations Act,
supra note 23, with all land not allocated to them constituting the "white homeland." Under
the controversial Representative Authorities Proclamation, No. AG 8 of 1980, these home-
lands were transformed into eleven ethnic areas, one for each recognized "population group,"
including whites, and each was to be governed by a "representative authority." Although such
authorities are designated "second tier" governments, i.e., below the central government, they
have more functions than the central government, and, in the case of the white representative
authority, far more financial resources.
89. H. Angula, supra note 87, at 4.
90. See supra note 87.
91. Inadequate education, poverty, and continuing discrimination in fact discourage all
but a few blacks. There is no university in Namibia, so blacks who wish to study law have to
leave the Territory or study by correspondence.
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detention without trial. The letter referred to the immunity of South Af-
rican forces for acts committed in the war zone of Namibia, 92 pointing
out that the principle of immunity was "open to abuse."'93 The Council
criticized the investigation launched by the heads of the security forces
into allegations against their own members as "an exercise in futility."' 94
The Council's second communication, sent after the Council had
waited nearly eight months for a response, again asked the Administra-
tor-General to appoint a commission of inquiry. This letter set forth spe-
cific abuses in detail and made reference to judicial findings in cases that
had reached the courts.95 On that same day, the Administrator-General
publicly announced that he would set up a such a commission, and a
draft proclamation was made public on November 2, 1983.
The draft proclamation was quickly attacked by the Council of
Churches of Namibia (CCN). After considering the proposal at an "in-
depth consultation of theologians," the church leaders called the pro-
posed proclamation "an insincere and manipulative effort by the authori-
ties to strengthen and justify existing security legislation. ' 96 The news
account added:
Two employees of the CCN were detained for security reasons soon after
the President of the CCN, Rev. Kauluma, and General Secretary, Dr.
Abisai Shejavali, issued a statement condemning the terms of the Commis-
sion. A Security Police spokesman said the detentions were not aimed at the
CCN, although it might be seen as such.97
The Bar Council's reaction was similar. On December 9, 1983, it wrote
the Secretary of the Commission that, although it welcomed the Admin-
istrator-General's decision to appoint a commission, it was forced to dis-
sociate itself from the proposed terms of reference, both the preambular
92. See Proc. AG 9 of 1977, supra note 85; see also Kauluma v. Minister of Defence, 1984
(4) S.A. 59 (S.W. Air. Sup. Ct.), Memorandum, infra §§ E.2 & E.10 (discussion of § 103ter of
the Defence Act, No. 44 of 1957).
93. Letter of Jan. 25, 1983 (copy of letter on file with the annotator and the Yale Journal of
International Law).
94. Id. Lubowski, supra note 81, at 13, refers to the statement of Brigadier Roos of the
military Board of Enquiry, as reported in the Windhoek Advertiser, May 10, 1983, that "Se-
curity Force members used blindfolds when questioning people, and often had to resort to
'manhandling' to obtain admissions when. . . the persons involved were unwilling to co-oper-
ate while being in possession of certain information about the movement of insurgents in their
areas." (Emphasis added.)
95. Memorandum Insake Geregtelike Komissie Von Ondersock, S.W.A. Balieraad (Bar
Council), Sept. 12, 1983 (copy on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
96. Windhoek Advertiser, Sept. 30, 1983. Ultimately, however, the Council of Churches,
like the Bar Council, decided to submit a memorandum to the Commission. The text of that
memorandum has not been released.
97. Id
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portion and the substantive provisions.98 The Bar Council was disturbed
that the proclamation establishing the Commission retained unchanged
the terms of reference, "without any attempt to address the reservations
expressed by the Bar Council and many others."99
The letter warned that the language of the preamble would be consid-
ered by many to reflect "the political and sectional value judgment of the
government ... ."10 The Council noted that many Namibians flatly
disagreed with that judgment. Consequently, the letter stated, "nothing
can be better designed than such words to bring the Commission under
suspicion as a mere propaganda instrument of the government of the
day." 10 1 The letter also attacked the restrictiveness of the terms of refer-
ence, which appeared to bar the consideration of, in particular, the appli-
cation of the security laws by the security forces and others. Since the
terms of reference appeared to include such a bar, it was argued that
witnesses testifying on the issue would not be assured of immunity, and
many persons who would otherwise testify would be discouraged from
submitting evidence. The letter also challenged the rule that evidence
should be heard in camera.' 0 2 Further, the Council questioned the com-
position of the Commission itself,'0 3 urging that at least one or two
prominent black persons be included. Finally, the Council deplored the
lack of adequate protection for witnesses, pointing out that "[evidence]
had been given in the Supreme Court where members of Koevet had
warned and threatened people not to say anything against the security
forces."' 1 4 The letter concluded:
The Society of Advocates ... has decided unanimously at its annual gen-
eral meeting on 2 December 1983, that it will be an exercise in futility for
98. Letter from S.W.A. Bar Council to the Secretary of the Commission of Enquiry into
Security Legislation in South West Africa, Dec. 9, 1983 (copy on file with the Yale Journal of
International Law) [hereinafter cited as Letter of Dec. 9, 1983]. The preambular portion of the
terms of reference reads: "In view of the revolutionary onslaught on the territory of South
West Africa and the terrorist struggle which is being waged in certain parts of the territory
.... It was followed by the substantive portion of the terms of reference: "[A Commission
of Inquiry is appointed] to inquire into, and to report on and make recommendations as to the
internal security of the said territory."
99. Letter of Dec. 9, 1983, supra note 98, at 2.
100. Id. at 3.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 3-4.
103. The Commission was composed of Justice H. P. van Dyck of the Transvaal Bench,
Chairman; H. J. Taljaard, territorial Secretary of Justice; Advocates J. D. du Bruyn of the
South African Department of Justice and G. S. Coetzee of the Windhoek Bar; and Attorney
Gert S. Muller of Windhoek.
104. Letter of Dec. 9, 1983, supra note 98, at 4.
Yale Journal of International Law
the Bar Council, to submit a memorandum and to prepare for giving evi-
dence, unless there is a sufficient response from the Administrator-General
and the Commission itself in regard to the problems raised herein. 105
In his response of December 20, 1983, the Secretary to the Commis-
sion indicated that it was very unlikely that the terms of reference would
be changed. However, he assured the Council that "despite the wording
of the regulation,. . . unless the situation merits otherwise evidence will
be given in public."106 He added that the Commission felt that existing
regulations adequately protected witnesses who wished to give
evidence.107
A month later, the Bar Council wrote that the Secretary's letter did
not address the Council's main concern, which was widening the terms
of reference to include the application of the security laws, the abuse of
power by security forces, and the absence of safeguards and protection
for Namibians to whom the laws are applied.108
The last letter of the series, from the Chairman of the Commission,
was dated February 16, 1984. Responding to the Bar Council's indica-
tion in its last letter that it wanted the problem resolved, the Chairman
held out the possibility (which was not fulfilled) that the terms of refer-
ence would be modified. 10 9 He then added, however:
I am satisfied though, that the terms of reference of my Commission is [sic]
wide enough to allow it to investigate and to make recommendations on the
application of security laws, the alleged abuse of power and/or lack of ade-
quate control and safeguards from higher authorities. After all, how would
my Commission ever be in a position to be able to express its views on the
fairness of legislation pertaining to security laws, if it is not presented with
first-hand information regarding the application of security laws in
practice? 11o
Ultimately, the Bar Council reluctantly decided to submit a formal
memorandum despite the failure to broaden the terms of reference.1 '
105. Id. at 4-5.
106. Letter from the Secretary of the Commission of Inquiry into Security Legislation in
South West Africa to the Chairman of the South West Africa Bar Council, Dec. 20, 1983, at 2
(copy on fie with the Yale Journal of International Law).
107. Id.
108. Letter from S.W.A. Bar Council to the Secretary of the Commission of Enquiry into
Security Legislation in South West Africa, Jan. 24, 1984 (copy on file with the Yale Journal of
International Law).
109. Letter from the Secretary of the Commission of Enquiry into Security Legislation in
South West Africa to the Chairman of the South West Africa Bar Council, Feb. 16, 1984, at 1
(copy on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
110. Id.
111. See notes 92-110 and accompanying text.
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F. Editing the Memorandum
The Memorandum is undated, but was submitted sometime during the
month of May, 1984. It is divided into seven sections and lettered alpha-
betically. In order to focus the discussion on the problems of the legal
and political system, the Memorandum has been edited.
Sections A and B of the Memorandum describe the correspondence
discussed immediately above, between, the Commission, the Administra-
tor-General, and the Bar Council concerning the terms of reference of
the Commission. In the edited version below, these sections have been
omitted. Section C lists additional sources of information which the Bar
Council believes the Commission should consult. Section D states the
"general approach" of the Society of Advocates.
Section E is especially important because it describes decided cases and
makes suggestions for change based on the perceived abuses evident in
the cases. Clearly repetitious material has been abridged, and the facts of
some of the more involved cases have been summarized. In some cases,
information that is common knowledge in Namibia has been added to
clarify the situation for outside readers. Section F lists certain matters
that time and space did not allow the Bar Council to discuss. Finally,
Section G analyzes conditions in Namibia and presents general
conclusions.
The Memorandum contains no footnotes. All footnotes have been ad-
ded by the annotator.' 12 In addition, all italics were part of the original
Memorandum. 113 All omissions, additions, and summaries are clearly
indicated. The meaning of the Memorandum has not been changed, and
the Bar Council's conclusions and comments are set out fully.
112. As to the orthography of African names, when the Memorandum contains varying
spellings, the annotator has made them consistent. The variants are indicated in brackets.
113. Copies of the original unedited version of the Memorandum and the letters annexed
to that veriion are on file with the Yale Journal of International Law.
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The Memorandum
Memorandum Of The SWA Bar Council, Acting On Behalf Of The
Society Of Advocates, In Regard To The Commission Of Enquiry
Into Security Legislation
A. * * *
B. * * *
C. Further Sources of Information:
1. In so far as security legislation, principles and practices in the Re-
public of South Africa are applicable to South West Africa, we wish to
refer to a publication entitled "Report on the Rabie Report-An Exami-
nation of Security Legislation in South Africa," published by the Centre
for Applied Studies of the University of the Witwatersrand in March
1982, reference ISBN 0-85494-729-9. This publication is in fact a report
of a seminar in which 36 advocates, attorneys and academic attorneys
with experience in the field of security legislation, participated.
2. We adhere also to the view that one of the obvious sources of infor-
mation, in addition to members of the Security Forces, for establishing
the application and practices under security legislation, are detainees
themselves, past and present. Without hearing evidence from this side of
the spectrum, the truth cannot possibly be ascertained. Unfortunately,
many such detainees have fled the country since their release, others live
in fear, some are banned persons, some have disappeared and some died
in detention. Nevertheless some will be available and may be willing to
give evidence.
2.1. We suggest e.g. that the calling of a man such as Mr. Herman
Toiva ya Toiva, 114 recently released after serving 16 years of his sentence
imposed at Pretoria in the trial of the State v Tuhadeleni en Andere 1969
(1) SA 153(A) 115 will give confidence in the objectivity of the
Commission.
114. The Memorandum refers to him as "Herman Toiva ya Toiva." The correct spelling
is Toivo ja Toivo. "Ja" and "ya" are alternative spellings, but Mr. Toivo appears to prefer
"ja." Since he was released from prison, Mr. Toivo has used Andimba rather than Herman,
the name he was known by earlier.
115. 1969 (1) S.A. 153 (S. Afr. App. Div.). See supra note 55.
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2.2 Another related source is some banned publications written by peo-
ple previously detained, but banned before the contents could become
widely known.' 16
We can mention for example a publication containing a large number
of affidavits used in an application for an interdict 17 in the Supreme
Court of South Africa, S.W.A Division, in the case of Franciscus Petrus-
Applicant vs. the Minister of Police, First Respondent, Col, Wilhelm Fred-
erick Schoon, Second Respondent. 118
2.3 A large number of detainees, alleged former SWAPO "terrorists" or
"guerrillas" are being detained indefinitely and without trial near
Marienta1 ' 19 and probably Oshakati.
116. See, eg., H. HUNKE & J. ELLIS, TORTURE-A CANCER IN OUR SOCIETY (undated
but known to be published in late 1977 or early 1978, Angelus Printing, Dobra, Namibia)
(copy on file with the Yale Journal ofInternational Law). This sixty-two page booklet consists
primarily of sworn statements of persons detained by South African security forces, giving
details of the torture they suffered while under interrogation; it also includes medical evidence
and photos. Heinz Hunke was a Roman Catholic priest serving in Namibia, and Justin Ellis
was a BBC correspondent and Anglican lay official in the Territory. The booklet was deemed
"undesirable" and banned at the end of January 1978, and the authors were subsequently
expelled from the Territory.
Other publications which deal with abuses of security legislation (or its application) in
Namibia and which are not widely known include: Statement of Axel Johannes, Administra-
tive Secretary of SWAPO (Mar. 16, 1979) (discussing an encounter with the police in Ovambo-
land on Feb. 7, 1979) (copy on fie with the Yale Journal oflnternationalLaw); "Namibia - A
Nation Wronged," a mimeographed report on a visit to Namibia by a mission sent by the
British Council of Churches 16-28 Nov. 1981, with conclusions and recommendations dated
Feb. 1982 (copy on file with the annotator); and South African Catholic Bishops' Conference,
Report on Namibia, May 12, 1982 (copy on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
117. An interdict is substantially equivalent to an injunction.
118. The Petrus case is discussed infra Memorandum § E.7.
119. The Mariental detainees were captured on May 4, 1978, in a South African raid on
Kassinga (Cassinga), a Namibian refugee camp in Angola, at the very moment when Pretoria's
representatives at the UN were announcing their government's acceptance of the Contact
Group's plan for a UN-monitored election in Namibia. See supra note 3 1.
Some 200 Namibians were abducted and held for a couple months at Oshakati, in northern
Namibia. A few were released there, and the rest were taken to the Keikamachab army camp
near Mariental, where they were held incommunicado, allegedly under AG 9, until after the
Memorandum's submission.
Eventually the identity of some detainees was established, and a habeus corpus proceeding
was brought on their behalf. Kauluma v. Minister of Defence, 1984 (4) S.A. 59 (S.W. Afr.
Sup. Ct.) (leave to appeal granted according to the Windhoek Advertiser, Nov. 26, 1984). The
proceeding was terminated by the invocation of § 103ter (4) of the Defence Act, No. 44 of
1957, which reads:
If any proceedings have at any time been instituted in a court of law against the State, the
State President, the Minister [of Defense], a member of the South African Defence Force
or any other person in the service of the State and the State President is of the opinion-
(a) that the proceedings were instituted by reason of an act advised, commanded, or-
dered, directed or done in good faith by the State President, the Minister or a member of
the South African Defence Force for the purposes of or in connection with the prevention
or suppression of terrorism in an operation area; and
(b) that it is in the national interest that the proceedings shall not be continued,
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A veil of secrecy hangs over these detentions and should be probed as a
matter of urgency.
D. General Approach of the Society of Advocates
1. It is one of the most important aims of the Society of Advocates,
incorporated in its constitution, to uphold the Rule of Law, i.e. law and
order based on justice, and in accordance with longstanding traditions,
precepts and institutions, recognized and upheld in civilised and progres-
sive societies.
We believe that the Rule of Law so defined, is indispensible in the long
run for the survival of civilisation itself.
1.1 We realise however that the ideals and norms of the rule of law
cannot always be maintained in a war situation or in the case of some
other national emergency.
Nevertheless, vigilance is necessary to ensure that modifications are
only made when absolutely necessary, and for so long as it is absolutely
necessary.
1.2 It is because of human weakness that wide and unrestrained power
leads to the abuse of power.
1.3 The abuse of power is apparent in the application of security laws
and practices in our country today.
1.4 In Namibia the institutions of the Rule of Law such as the Police,
the Courts, the legal practitioners and the law itself are suspect in the
eyes of the overwhelming majority of our people.
1.5 A large section of the population never had any confidence in the
security forces and security laws applicable to this country and probably
has less confidence in them today.
1.6 This Commission can make some contribution to instil and/or to
regain confidence in some of our institutions in this country by a coura-
geous, impartial, and objective search for the truth, analysis and
recommendations.
he shall authorize the Minister of Justice to issue a certificate directing that the proceed-
ings shall not be continued.
Cf The "BOSS Act," discussed infra note 132.
However, the outrage occasioned by this interference with the judicial process, as well as the
public concern about the detainees, whose existence and incarceration the authorities kept
secret, apparently persuaded the South African government to release the detainees. All but
one were freed by October 1984. Windhoek Advertiser, Oct 19, 1984, at 1, col. 1; Wash. Post,
Oct. 20, 1984, at A6, col. 3.
A month later it was announced that some of the detainees planned to sue the authorities for
R 1,000,000 ($500,000) for wrongful detention. Windhoek Advertiser, Nov. 26, 1984. Legal
practitioners are still speculating whether section 103ter will be invoked again to quash the
suit for damages. As of mid-December 1985, no decision had been handed down.
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2. * * * [The Bar Council criticizes, in whole blocks taken from its
correspondences, the Administrator-General for failure to take account
of the Council's reservations and criticisms and to amend accordingly the
draft proclamation establishing the Commission.]
2.2 The differences between our situation and that in the R.S.A. [Re-
public of South Africa] and particularly the causes of the armed struggle,
have been investigated and debated in trials before the Supreme Court of
South West Africa such as:
The State v. Josef Sacharias and Others, 1983 (1) S.A. 833.120
The State v. Angula Muvala, Supreme Court of S.W.A., 26.5.1983
unreported.121
2.2.1 It is a matter of some concern that very few cases of persons
charged under the Terrorism Act have been brought before our Courts in
recent years. It seems that the policy at present is to fake [take?] alterna-
tive action against alleged "terrorists" and those who assist them. This
matter also deserves the attention of the Commission.
2.3 Many Namibians are caught in the physical and political crossfire
between opposing forces. They are threatened by both sides and live in
fear from day to day. It is in the face of such division and strife and in
such circumstances that there is a need for all those who serve in the
administration of justice, whether as State employees, judges, advocates
on the staff of the Attorney-General's office or advocates and attorneys in
private practice to remain impartial and uphold the ideals of the Rule of
Law in so far as circumstances permit.
We are aware of atrocities committed by all sides and some positive
contributions made by all sides.
We see the profession of policemen as a noble one without which jus-
tice cannot prevail, but then their task must remain the protection of
society, the bringing of alleged offenders to trial and not that of licensed
and programmed killers.
We must welcome the establishment of our own police force, 122 but
hope that care will be taken to build on sound foundations.
120. 1983 (1) S.A. 833 (S.W. Mr. Sup. Ct.) (original in Afrikaans).
121. S.W. Mr. Sup. Ct., May 26, 1983 (unreported).
122. The control of the police in Namibia has alternated between Pretoria and Windhoek
ever since territorial whites obtained limited home rule under the South West Africa Constitu-
tion Act, No. 42 of 1925 (superseded by South West Africa Constitution Act, No. 39 of 1968).
Thus, the reestablishment of the South West African Police on April 1, 1981, provided great
nostalgic satisfaction to many old-timer whites. Windhoek Advertiser, April 2, 1981; S. Afri-
can Police Give Up Control in Namibia, Fin. Times (London), Apr. 2, 1981, at 3, col 1.
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E. Comment on some decided cases and submissions flowing
therefrom:
1. Security laws and abuses of power related to them have a long his-
tory in this country.
The case of Wood and Another v. Ondangwa [Ondangua] Tribal Au-
thority and Others, 1975 SA 294 (A.D.),123 is an example of the abuse of
power for political purposes on a massive scale by Tribal authorities.
Although the Appellate Division in this case did not deal with the part
played by the government, the security police and others, it was well
known at the time and known to some of the members of the Society of
Advocates that the government and the Minister of Native Affairs of
S.A., were not only aware of the abuse, but approved of it and even en-
couraged it and that the Security Police in S.W.A. actively aided and
abetted the malpractices.
* * * [The case was brought by Anglican Bishop Wood and Lu-
theran Bishop (of the North) Auala and some victims to enjoin an
Owambo "tribal authority" (a governmental body composed of local
chiefs selected by Pretoria) from whipping persons handed over to them
for punishment as SWAPO supporters.
In a period of great unrest, after more than 98% of eligible Owambos
had boycotted tribal elections, persons suspected of political agitation in
"Owambo" 124 were detained by the Security Police under Proclamation
R. 17 of 1972. Afterwards they were turned over to the tribal authorities
for "punishment." The victims-including political leaders, elderly per-
sons, and women-were ordered stripped and whipped in public without
any trial or after a farcical one.]125
The consequence was that many more people became disillusioned
with our system of justice-fled their country and joined the resistance.
In this case the reluctance and/or the inability of the S.W.A. Division of
the Supreme Court of South Africa 126 [to give relief] 127 was amply
123. 1975 (2) S.A. 294 (S.W. Afr. App. Div.).
124. "Owambo" was for generations known as "Ovamboland," and its inhabitants as
"Ovambos." The names were changed, allegedly on the recommendation of anthropologists.
linguists, without consulting the people concerned.
125. In the proceeding for an injunction, the applicants' witnesses testified that the victims
had committed no crime. Furthermore, tribal custom, which the chiefs were presumably ap-
plying, did not sanction the whipping of women or elderly men under any circumstances, or of
the public whipping of any adults. In addition, the severity of the sentences far exceeded that
permitted by tribal custom. This was confirmed to the annotator in a long discussion with
Bishop Auala, who had been secretary to a chief when he was young, and who was therefore
well-versed in tribal custom.
126. The Supreme Court of Namibia (i.e., the South West Africa Division of the South
African Supreme Court) is the territorial court of general jurisdiction, like the New York
Supreme Court. It has original jurisdiction and also hears appeals from magistrates' courts.
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demonstrated, as in later cases such as Franciscus Petrus v. Minister of
Police and Another, and Ashipembe, Nakaua and Nahanga v. Minister of
Police and Others.128
The Appeal Court pointed out the inability of the individual victim in
an area such as Owambo to take his case to court timeously.
2. Perhaps the most dramatic exposure of the abuses of security laws
and malpractice in S.W.A. appears in the recent case of U. Kakuva and
Another v. Administrator-General and Minister of Police, presently on
appeal. 129
In this case, which was an application by the wife of one Johannes
Kakuva for a declaration presuming his death, his Lordship Mouton J.
found that Johannes Kakuva together with a number of other citizens of
Kaokoland in S.W.A. were detained by the Security Police at Opuwa. 130
All were detained in a small room without sufficient light or air. The
detainees were blindfolded to disorientate them.
A large number of those detained were detained and blindfolded even
though the Security Police knew from the outset that there were no legal
grounds for their detention.
When released, after two days or more, those released were left to their
own means of returning to their homes approximately 60 kilometres
away.
The Court found that several of those detained for longer than two
days, including Johannes Kakuva, were beaten by the Security Police
and that Johannes Kakuva died at Opuwa in detention.
Those not released at an early stage were held in chains and one was
kept in a toilet for days and another in a small cubicle for a gas bottle-
where he could only crouch.131
The respondents' version was that Johannes Kakuva and others were
detained under AG 9 of 1977 and that on the first day of questioning,
Kakuva had agreed to become a spy for the Security Police. He was
Appeals are taken from it to the Appellate Division of the South Africa Supreme Court, which
sits in Bloemfontein. Formerly known as the High Court of South West Africa, for several
decades the South West Africa Division lacked jurisdiction over the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel
(which was then virtually inaccessible from the rest of the Territory); during that period the
Eastern Caprivi Zipfel was under the jurisdiction of the Transvaal Supreme Court.
127. The South West Africa Division found that none of the plaintiffs had standing to
bring the action, but the Appellate Division held that the two bishops had a legal interest in
the physical and moral welfare of their parishioners and of all Christians in the area.
128. See infra Memorandum § E.8 and text accompanying note 149.
129. The appeal was reportedly dismissed. Windhoek Observer, Dec. 15, 1984.
130. Older maps refer to "Ohopoho," instead of "Opuwa" (or "Opuwe"), and to the
"Kaokoveld" instead of "Kaokoland."
131. See infra Addendum, text accompanying note 193.
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taken the day after to some remote spot in Kaokoland to make contact
with SWAPO insurgents and then to meet the Security Police subse-
quently to pass on whatever information he had obtained. The story goes
on to say that Kakuva did not keep his appointment and was never seen
again and the respondents also accepted that he was dead, but not as a
result of any assault by them.
It was common cause that Johannes Kakuva was a person with a
strong personality, a relatively rich man and an influential and respected
man in his area-with a close and happy family-including wife and
about 8 minor children-father-brothers and sisters and so on.
It was common cause that when enquiries were initially made by rela-
tives, friends and even headmen at the Security Branch, Opuwa, mem-
bers of the Security Branch deliberately lied to those who enquired and
for a substantial period persisted with the story that Kakuva was still
held at Opuwa.
It was common cause that no members of the security branch ever
took the trouble to enquire whether Kakuva had a family, had
dependants, and no effort was ever made to inform these people of the
circumstances of Kakuva's disappearance and presumed death.
It was common cause that the attorneys for applicant before the insti-
tution of legal proceedings informed the Administrator-General of the
dissatisfaction of the family at the disappearance of Kakuva, but the Ad-
ministrator-General merely called in the head of the Security Police and
accepted a written report, unverified by affidavits.
It was also common cause that the then head of the Security Police
only relied on the mere say-so of Captain King, the most senior of the
team of Security Police interrogating the detainees at Opuwa at the rele-
vant time.
When legal proceedings were launched in which grave allegations were
made by several surviving detainees, the Administrator-General and the
Minister of Police gave instructions to defend the good name of the
Police.
Neither the Administrator-General nor the head of Security Police
took any further steps to investigate the matter, but left it in the hands of
the State Attorney. A member of the Security Police, a non-commis-
sioned officer, was however assigned to assist the aforesaid State Attor-
ney, and he admitted into evidence that he became in effect a mere
messenger of the State Attorney.
He explained that he had refrained from questioning the detainees
themselves and merely acted under the instructions of the State
Attorney.
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It is significant that at no stage was there any indication from the au-
thorities that proper investigation would be instituted with a view to a
possible criminal prosecution-not even after the damning evidence in
the course of the trial and the clear judgment of the Court on 14 June
1983.
It must be stressed here that even if the story of the Security Police
was true, their own story amounted to the gravest abuse of the rights of a
detainee, i.e., to send the detainee on a dangerous mission on the basis of
a so-called consent obtained in detention when there was no opportunity
for the exercise of his own free will. At no stage was any attempt made
to compensate the widow and children for the loss of a father on alleged
active service of the government.
The Security Police could not produce any record of the detention at
Opuwa and explained that they were not required to keep records of AG
9 of 1977 detainees. They all confirmed that they knew of no standing
order, regulation or other instructions from higher authority pertaining
to the detention by them of detainees.
However, it was alleged that certain investigation diaries had been
kept, that some of these diaries had been destroyed by them after use but
that those of Johannes Kakuva and four of the other detainees had been
kept.
When Applicant applied for the disclosure of these diaries, the Admin-
istrator-General stepped in and issued a certificate in terms of Section
29(1) of Act 101 of 1969 which forbade the disclosure of the said investi-
gation diaries. 132
The Court was powerless to question this order.
Prima facie, the disclosure of these documents could only aid the
search for the truth.
Again, this particular exercise of the powers of the Administrator-
General in terms of the aforesaid General Laws Amendment Act on the
132. Section 29 of the General Law Amendment Act, No. 101 of 1969 (as amended by the
General Law Amendment Act, No. 102 of 1972, § 25); superseded by Internal Security Act,
No. 74 of 1982. Section 66 of the 1969 Act is commonly called the "BOSS Act" because it was
enacted to protect the Bureau of State Security (since renamed) from exposure of its activities
as well as from civil suits for damages. Ostensibly a rule of evidence, the section empowered
any cabinet minister (the term now includes the Adminstrator-General) to intervene in any
court or administrative agency to prevent the introduction of any testimony, information, or
evidence which would otherwise be compellable or permissible. The Minister or Administra-
tor-General need only present his affidavit to the court or agency stating that he has consid-
ered the matter and that, in his opinion, the evidence will prejudicially affect the security of
the state. The court or agency may not question the affidavit or the affiant. Cf § 103ter (4) of
the Defence Act, discussed supra note 119.
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ground that the security of the State could be prejudiced by the disclo-
sure of the aforesaid investigation diaries, is unacceptable and should be
thoroughly investigated by the Commission.
The law should be amended in S.W.A. to at least empower the Court
to override the decisions of the executive in certain circumstances.
This law, used in conjunction with security legislation, the Official
Secrets Act No. 16 of 1956133 and Section 153 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977,134 often effectively prevents the exposure of crimes and/
or malpractices. By so doing the system of administration of justice be-
comes suspect.
The case continued for several months before a decision was given.
The Court found that a lot of time and money could have been saved if
the Administrator-General had launched an impartial and thorough in-
vestigation when requested to do so by attorneys for Applicant.
It was also clearly established that the Administrator-General acted on
mere letters from the Security Branch without any substantiation on affi-
davit, . . . [in issuing] orders for further detention of detainees held
under Proc. AG 9.135
In some cases it approved the documents [to be] presented to Court,
that were prepared in advance by the Security Police and were merely
rubber-stamped by the representative of the Attorney-General. The ex-
planation for this remained uncertain and confusing throughout the trial.
It was also clearly substantiated at the trial that the letters written by
the Security Branch in support of applications for authority for further
detentions, were often inaccurate and contained serious misrep-
resentations.
It was clearly established at the trial that Proc. AG 9 of 1977 was used
"to remove citizens from society," without trial, and that this interpreta-
tion and policy enjoyed the support of the Security Police and the Ad-
ministrator-General and some members of the Ministers Council. 36
133. No. 16 of 1956, superseded by Protection of Information Act, No. 84 of 1982.
134. No. 51 of 1977. Section 153(2) provides that a court in a criminal case may, if con-
vinced that a witness (other than an accused) would be in danger if he or she testifies, order
"(a) that such person shall testify behind closed doors. . . [and] (b) that the identity of such
person shall not be revealed or that it shall not be revealed for a period specified by the court."
135. Under AG 9, as amended, a person may be detained by the arresting officer for thirty
days for the purpose of interrogation. Thereafter, the Administrator-General may order the
detainee held indefinitely. See supra note 85. The Administrator-General normally orders
further detention on the basis of representations made to him by the Security Branch.
136. The Ministers Council was a quasi-cabinet in the "government" established by South
Africa in Namibia following the 1978 election. See supra note 41.
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This was given as the explanation why people detained for months
were only questioned on one occasion, on the second day of their deten-
tion, and why no written statements were ever taken from them.
It was also common cause that a strange construction existed at the
regular place of detention at Opuwa.
The possible inference to be drawn from the mere existence of this
structure was that it could be used for irregular interrogation methods. 137
Whenever the Applicant's Counsel attempted to put questions on the
use of this structure, Counsel for the Administrator-General and the
Minister of Police objected that it was irrelevant, and the Court upheld
this objection.
Nevertheless it is submitted that it will be justified and advisable if this
Commission can establish the facts in this connection.
It was also clearly established in this trial that it would be impossible
for the ordinary individual to take a matter such as this to Court without
financial assistance from others.138
It was apparent at the trial that many of the local community, includ-
ing some headmen, were very unhappy with the conduct of the Security
Police.
It is an example of how abuses and malpractices under the shield of
security laws, can lead to the alienation of our people, rather than their
protection and survival.
It is submitted that the combination of provisions to keep certain facts
secret used in conjunction with Security Laws and practices may in some
cases assist in the protection of the security of the State, but in others it
may serve merely to cover up scandalous actions, and thereby undermine
State Security in the long run.
137. The Bar Council's carefully worded suspicion as to the use of the "strange construc-
tion" reflects the continuous stream of reports concerning torture by South African security
forces. In Kauluma v. Minister of Defence, 1984 (4) S.A. 59 (S.W. Afr. Sup. Ct.), the affidavit
of Benedictus Shilongo detailed the treatment to which he and other Namibians seized at
Kassinga were subjected while they were held at Oshakati. (He was released when most of the
detainees were transferred to Mariental). The attorney for the applicants summarized in Eng-
lish the fifth paragraph of Shilongo's affidavit (written in Afrikaans):
[D]uring his detention electric shocks were applied to him and. . . he was assaulted in
various ways. . . . He saw that one of the detainees. . . Nikodemus Katofa, was sus-
pended for long periods with his arms tied to a pole with his feet off the ground. He
further states that the most part he was blindfolded and that he frequently heard scream-
ing in the camp.
(Copy of the application with appended affidavits on file with the annotator.)
138. Many legal proceedings, such as the application for the release of the Mariental de-
tainees, supra note 119, have been financed by concerned foreign human rights organizations,
such as the Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law,
and various churches.
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We are convinced that the review of these provisions is necessary.
AG 9 of 1977 should be drastically amended to provide [detention]
only for the purpose of interrogation and not for indefinite detention
without trial. Without adequate controls, legislation such as AG 9 of
1977 cannot stand without abuse and. . . controls even by the highest
executives can never protect the citizen.
What is required is access to the detainee by his family and/or a legal
representative of their choice and access to the Supreme Court at an
early stage.
In addition no prescription should run against any detainee for actions
instituted against the State by him or by his dependent for the period in
detention and/or the period from detention to the date that his death is
established or presumed.
3. A recent case which lifted the veil of secrecy on the activities of the
special police unit "Koevoet" must be mentioned.
We refer to the application of Kandohombe [Kandohomba] vs
Hamakali, Ruben and the Administrator General, which was heard
before the Supreme Court of S.W.A. on 22 July 1983.
In this application applicant, a shopkeeper in Owambo and a man of
some means, applied for an interdict against certain members of Koevoet
to be restrained from threatening him and from molesting him.
He averred that it served no purpose to lay complaints with the police
against Koevoet because the ordinary police were reluctant to interfere in
the affairs of Koevoet, and he and the people of Owambo lived in fear of
Koevoet.
In support of his allegation that he feared for his life, he stated that
another person was shot and killed the previous year at a nearby restau-
rant at Oshakati by members of Koevoet without reason.
The Supreme Court granted him a rule nisi, serving as an interim in-
terdict and referred the matter to the Attorney General for action and
suggested that Counsel for Applicant, B. O'Linn S.C.,1 39 should see the
Attorney General and bring to his attention some matters apparent from
the papers.
It appeared that the dead man referred to, one Moses Aaron, was ap-
parently removed from hospital by members of Koevoet and buried,
without notice to his relatives, in some unknown grave and without any
prior investigation or inquest.
139. Chairman of the Bar Council. "S.C." is the abbreviation for State Counsel, the
equivalent of Queen's (King's) Counsel in Britain.
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It appeared from the papers prima facie that some serious offences had
been committed by some senior unknown police officers and/or officials
in allowing or instructing such a course.
The Attorney General was fully apprized of these facts and informed
that not only the client, and the Court, but also the Bar Council, were
interested in this matter.
The Attorney General ordered a prosecution against the said
Hamakali for pointing afirearm at the said Kandohombo, and Hamakali,
represented by the State Attorney, was duly convicted and his subse-
quent appeal to the Supreme Court dismissed.
In the meantime, the said Koevoet policeman, Hamakali, allegedly
died after detonating a landmine.
At the criminal trial aforesaid, a senior officer of Koevoet, Major Win-
ter, gave evidence for the accused and stated that he had sent the afore-
said Hamakali and another member of Koevoet to go and warn the
aforesaid Kandohombe for having lodged complaints against Koevoet.
What sort of "warning" and his right to do so were not investigated in
Court.
Counsel for the Applicant, on behalf of his client and the Bar Council
pointed out to the Attorney General, Mr. Brunette, on several occasions
the need for investigating and establishing under what right Koevoet was
acting when they "warn" citizens and under what right Koevoet buried
the man [who was] shot without an enquiry, without an inquest and
without notifying the relatives. It was pointed out that prima facie of-
fences under the Inquest Act and even the offence of attempting to defeat
the ends of justive had been committed.
The Attorney General informed Counsel that he had not power to take
any initiative, that he could only take decisions on matters referred to
him by the police and that it appeared that no inquest had ever been held
and that the police (undisclosed) had given the explanation that the man
killed was a terrorist who had tried to escape and that they could appar-
ently not understand why their action should be queried.
Counsel pointed out to the said Attorney General that according to
the affidavits supporting the aforesaid application, the deceased, although
an alleged "Terrorist" brought back from Angola about two years prior
to his death, had been in the pay of the government for a substantial
period and that there was no support in the available affidavits for the
allegation that the deceased was "a terrorist shot when attempting to
escape."
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The Attorney General subsequently informed the said Counsel that his
successor, Adv. T. Louw, had ordered an inquest into the death of the
deceased, Moses Aaron.
Counsel, Adv. O'Linn, also explained to the said Adv. Louw, after the
latter had become Attorney General, the concern of the Bar Council.
On or about 24 March 1984, the last mentioned Attorney General in-
formed the said Adv. O'Linn that an inquest had been held and that it
was unsatisfactory and that he had raised certain queries. He was un-
willing to allow Counsel insight into the inquest documents at this stage.
To date, no investigation has been conducted into possible offences under
the Inquest Act, and no prosecutions have taken place in this connection.
It is submitted that the Commission should also as a matter of ur-
gency, investigate the following questions:
(i) The circumstances surrounding the killing and burial of Moses
Aaron and particularly whether or not there was a cover-up by the police
involved ....
[W]itnesses Ephraim Iyambo and Lebeus Shipoke14 should be called
by the Commission as witnesses.
(ii) In view of the alleged allegations by unknown members of the Po-
lice Force that the deceased Moses Aaron was a terrorist who had tried to
escape, an investigation is required into the conditions under which "ter-
rorists" are held and particularly who the inmates are of the "police
camp" known as "Onaimundi-bases" at Oshakati.
(iii) What are the rights of Security Forces such as Koevoet to kill and
bury citizens of Owambo, without informing the relatives, without an
open enquiry or inquest and in their unfettered discretion.
(iv) Can Koevoet do this to an alleged terrorist killed in a place like
Oshakati and not in the heat of battle?
(v) Is the mere say-so of members of Koevoet, that a slain person was a
"terrorist," enough?
(vi) Is this a practice?
(vii) In which cases has this practice been followed?
(viii) Where are the graves of the people so killed and buried?
(ix) Why and in terms of which law, does Koevoet warn citizens who
had complained against them?
(x) Who controls Koevoet, and what are these controls? How do you
qualify for membership of Koevoet and what is the need and task of such
a unit?
140. This suggests that some prior reference to them was omitted. From the text it seems
probable that they were witnesses to the death or burial of Moses Aaron.
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(xi) What machinery exists for the investigation of complaints against
Koevoet?
(xii) What has happened to prisoners, alleged [to be] SWAPO ter-
rorists, arrested or detained by Koevoet and other units of the Security
Forces?
(xiii) Under what laws are these people detained at Oshakati, Mariental
and elsewhere?
(xiv) What controls are there relating to [the conditions of] detention?
(xv) For what purposes are these detainees used and what is required
from them to qualify for "rehabilitation"?41
(xvi) The effectiveness and appropriateness of the present inquest proce-
dures, even when applied as a means to establish the truth.
(xvii) Whether or not the office of the Attorney-General requires more
powers to take initiatives in cases of this nature and to what extent
amendments of the law are required.
(xviii) The need to end the division of the Police Forces into those do-
ing ordinary police work and those special units with a mandate to kill
rather than to arrest and charge before the courts of law.
The submission is that there is no need for any police unit with in-
structions to kill in the first place instead of to arrest and bring to trial.
If the authorities feel the need for such a unit, it should be completely
divorced from the Police Force as such and not go under the name and
title of police.142
141. The Administrator-General has offered amnesty to deserters from PLAN for a
number of years; however, all deserters must undergo a period of "rehabilitation" before they
are allowed to return home. When they return, their immediate past history may leave them
little alternative to the kinds of work undertaken by P. Matheus as a member of Koevoet, see
infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text, or by the ex-SWAPO member who allegedly spied
on passers-by at the Oshivello gate, see infra note 151 and accompanying text.
The Namibian, Dec. 13, 1985, at 8, col. 1, reports that a former SWAPO guerrilla was given
an R2000 ($750) bonus for giving himself up under the amnesty proclaimed by the newly
installed interim government, superseding that proclaimed by the Administrator-General. The
former guerrilla said he would join SWATF, the Territorial Forces, "because I don't see any
other place where I can protect my life." Id.
142. The HNP memorandum, supra note 63, reportedly described Koevoet as "extremely
successful," and contributing more to peace and order "than it got credit for." Windhoek
Observer, Nov. 10, 1984, at 26, col. 4; Windhoek Advertiser, Nov. 9, 1984.
In August 1984, the South African Media Council (a self-regulating professional body) con-
sidered a complaint by Brig. J. V. van der Merwe, a Police spokesman, against the Pretoria
News for an editorial entitled "Mad Dogs?," which referred to the Namibian Bar Council's
Memorandum on the alleged activities of Koevoet as "the most damning indictment yet of this
shadowy section of the police. .. ." The newspaper defended its editorial as fair comment,
but the Brigadier claimed that it had evoked a "feeling of hatred and loathing" by the public
towards the Police and argued that the Bar Council's submissions were one-sided and unsub-
stantiated. See Media Panel Discusses Paper's Criticism of Police, FBIS (Mid. East), Aug. 7,
1984, at U7 (text from Johannesburg SAPA in English).
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4. * * * [State v. Nagel 143 involved a young member of the "police
special task unit" who was convicted of culpable homicide for shooting a
black civilian "in cold blood" in Windhoek.
Evidence was given in camera by the officer in charge of training the
unit. The Bar Council stated that they were "reliably informed" that the
officer testified that he trained members to be "programmed killers" and
would like the defendant back in his unit despite his crime. The authors
of the memorandum added that a senior officer of the unit had been pic-
tured recently wearing a vest with the motto "killing is our business-
business is good."]
The evidence of the officer given in camera as well as that of the psy-
chiatrist called to testify in mitigation, should be studied by the Commis-
sion to get an insight in the norms applied by these units and the effect
thereof on the administration of justice and our community. It seems
clear that the norm of the '!policemen" of Koevoet and [of] this special
task force is to shoot first and ask questions later-even if the person in
front of them is outwardly an unarmed civilian.
Instead, therefore, of the first duty to protect the civilian, the purpose
here is to rather protect the "policeman" and sacrifice the civilian. Fur-
thermore, the rule is not to wound the suspect so that he may be arrested
and taken into custody, but to empty the magazine and to kill in order to
prevent the possibility of the suspect defending himself. The policy and
method are even more dangerous and explosive when the elements of
"race" and ideology are part and parcel of the indoctrination.
The policy and method of "programming" members of these units
may certainly enable the security forces to kill more terrorists, but cer-
tainly also more civilians.
We believe there is a need for an urgent investigation by the Commis-
sion into the methods of training of this unit and to propose ways and
means to bring this unit nearer to the tasks and norms of conduct of the
true police officer. Alternatively, to abolish it, or, in the further alterna-
tive, to separate this unit also completely from the police force as such.
* * * [In State v. J. Paulus and P. Matheus] Koevoet members were
convicted of murder, rape and robbery. 144
Before joining Koevoet Matheus was a SWAPO guerrilla, and Paulus
was a UNITA fighter, 145 who had "seen and experienced violence from
143. S.W. Mr. Div., Aug. 26, 1981 (unreported).
144. The sentences of Paulus and Matheus were confirmed by the Appellate Division.
Windhoek Observer, Sept. 19, 1984.
145. UNITA, under Jonas Savimbi, is engaged in civil war against the Angolan govern-
ment with both covert and overt assistance from the South African government. Captured
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an early age." The judge accepted evidence of a psychiatrist-neurologist
that indoctrination by both UNITA and Koevoet had made the defend-
ants "in effect programmed killers."146
Paulus testified that village people who did not co-operate sufficiently
in Koevoet's view were often assaulted by members of Koevoet. He ad-
ded that money, described as "kopgeld ["bounty money"] is paid mem-
bers of Koevoet for every alleged terrorist killed.'1 47
"It was clear," the Bar Council stated, "from the evidence that the
inhabitants of Owambo live in fear of Koevoet."
State witness Simon Nghoshi, the investigating officer in the case and a
warrant officer with 14 years' service in the South West Africa Police,
refused to answer questions about the activities of Koevoet on cross-ex-
amination because he feared for his own life should he do so. However,
he testified that there was a state of lawlessness in the (segregated black)
township of Oneshila, Oshakati, in Owambo, because there was no con-
trol over weapons and ammunition issued to Koevoet members; that un-
disciplined Koevoet members committed crimes of violence against the
inhabitants; and that policemen attempting to investigate these crimes
were in danger of their lives.
The presiding judge, Strydom J., said in his judgment at p. 250 of the
record:
From his evidence and the submissions that were put to him, a disturbing
situation has come to light .... Before I proceed to sentence the accused, I
want to comment on the evidence of Warrant Officer Nghoshi in connec-
tion with the problems the police encountered in carrying out arrests in the
RSA Commando Reveals Mission Tactics, FBIS (Mid. East), May 29, 1985, at U1 (text from
Luanda Domestic Service Broadcast) (press interview with a member of the South African
Special Forces captured while attempting to blow up Gulf refinery at Cabinda, the action to
have been attributed to UNITA); Guardian (U. K.), Nov. 21, 1985, at 9, col. 1; Guardian
(U.K.), Dec. 16, 1985, at 8, col. 1. See also J. STOCKWELL, supra note 59.
146. Record, at 495 et seq. (on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
147. It is commonly supposed that the attitudes engendered by the offer of bounty money
affect all security forces. Thus there are repeated questions about the ratio of "terrorists"
killed to those captured by the South African army. See KOENIG, NAMIBIA: THE RAVAGES
OF WAR 47 (IDAF 1983) (citing testimony concerning the capture and treatment by South
African Forces of combatants of PLAN, given by IDAF to the Ad Hoe Working Group of
Experts of the UN Commission on Human Rights, in London, July 12, 1982); see also 1982:
Tighter Restrictions, Continued Repression, 1982 SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT ANNUAL RE-
PORT 25; Windhoek Advertiser, Sept. 21, 1983; Windhoek Observer, July 30, 1983.
In S. v. Rabanus Ndara, Mar. 22, 1984 (S.W. Afr. Div.), the defendant, a section com-
mander, was convicted of murdering his colleague by shooting him between the eyes with a
pistol. On cross-examination, Ndara indicated that he had seen people shot in the same way
before, explaining, "I have seen that when we have captured SWAPO terrorists and the officer
commanding says-you must shoot him and usually we aim in this manner, we shoot him in
this manner." Ndara indicated that in such cases the SWAPO captive dies. (Translation from
the Afrikaans of the court record by a Namibian lawyer) (emphasis added).
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case of crimes committed by members of Koevoet. I find it quite incompre-
hensible that in such a case there wasn't a greater degree of coordination
between commanders of the various units ...
Record p. 513. (Unofficial translation from the Afrikaans by a South Af-
rican lawyer.)
The Bar Council concluded that "the Commission should take a close
look at this evidence and even call some of the witnesses to testify before
the Commission."]
6. * * * [In S. v. Mushimba [Muchimba] and Others145 the conviction
of the defendants for the murder of Owambo chief Elias was reversed on
the ground of misconduct on the part of the government: The Security
Police had obtained information from a partner of the defending attor-
neys as to the defense being prepared on behalf of the accused.
The Bar Council commented that "Mushimba's case demonstrates the
lengths to which the Security Police are willing to go in order to achieve
their objectives."
Subsequently Nkandi and others were charged with the same
murder. 149
When the state attempted to introduce several confessions, the defense
alleged that they were obtained by "assaults, intimidation and other ir-
regularities." It established that several suspects and potential witnesses,
detained under section 6 of the Terrorism Act, were taken by the Secur-
ity Police to a secluded area for extensive questioning. When the defense
asked for records, an officer testified that he had destroyed any that had
been made. The prosecution was forced to withdraw the confessions, and
its case collapsed.
The memorandum noted that these cases also illustrated the ease with
which provisions for magistrates' visits to detainees could be evaded.] 150
7. * * * [In Franciscus Petrus v. Minister of Police and Cot. Schoon, a
father sought an interdict to prevent assaults on his son, who had been
detained by the Security Police under section 6 of the Terrorism Act. The
application included many affidavits by other detainees who alleged that
148. 1977 (2) S.A. 829 (S.W. Afr. App. Div.).
149. All charges were withdrawn before judgment. Therefore, no official record was made.
Notes of conversation with defense counsel on file with the annotator.
150. South African detention laws traditionally contained at least a conditional provision
for regular visits to detainees by a magistrate. E.g., § 6(7) of the Terrorism Act, No. 83 of
1967, superseded by the Internal Security Act, No. 74 of 1982, supra note 76, provided, "If
circumstances so permit, a detaineee shall be visited in private by a magistrate at least once a
fortnight." (emphasis added.) Such provisions do not specify what a magistrate shall do if a
complaint is made. Apparently most magistrates report complaints to the officer in charge of
the detainees, who may thereupon "punish" them for complaining-while continuing the con-
ditions or actions complained of.
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they had been tortured and included photos of some of the injuries they
sustained.
The respondents replied that the detainee had never complained to a
visiting magistrate of any mistreatment.
The Bar Council pointed out that the facts of this case clearly demon-
strated again the ineffectiveness of the "safeguard" in the detention laws
which provides for periodic visits to detainees by magistrates. The memo-
randum stated that counsel "agreed" that the absence of complaints to
the magistrate was not probative because a detainee would not be likely
to complain to a magistrate when he/she knew that the latter would sim-
ply report the complaint to the police who had custody. The laws did not
give the magistrate authority to protect the detainee or to obtain his/her
release; he could not even communicate with the detainee's (or appli-
cant's) lawyers.
While the judges of the South West Africa Division were delivering
their judgment rejecting the application, a report was received that the
detainee had made a report to the magistrate that he had been assaulted.
Although informed of this complaint, the Court continued reading their
judgment. At the end the Court stated that the new information would
not have affected their judgment.
An appeal was taken, but became moot when the detainee was
released.]
8. * * * [Ashipemba and Nakaua [Nakana] v. Minister of Police was
an application for habeas corpus to compel the police to produce appli-
cants' husbands to Court. The three applicants averred that their hus-
bands had disappeared, and in each case the applicant believed that he
had been taken into custody by members of the Security Forces.
According to the second applicant people in camouflage uniform with
FM rifles broke into the Nakaua residence, seized Johannes Nakaua, and
took him away in a "heavy vehicle which sounded like an Ondjamba
(olifant)-a type of vehicle used by the Security Forces."
Matthias Ashipemba disappeared on his way to Windhoek to meet his
wife, Rauha, who was returning from abroad.
Mathias Nkanga [Nakanga], "a plain man, uneducated, apolitical,
who only wanted a lift to go and seek work at Tsumeb," disappeared
with Ashipemba, with whom he was riding.
After the hearing on the application, to which formal objections were
entered, lawyers on both sides agreed that Brigadier Coetzee, a "high
ranking" South African police officer, should conduct an impartial inves-
tigation. But the investigation "was unsatisfactory and remained
indecisive."
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Army records showed that the vehicle in which Ashipemba and a pas-
senger were driving was last seen and recorded at the Oshivello
[Oshivelo] gate1 51 on the road from Ondangwa to Windhoek. Coetzee did
not follow up, and the soldier who made the record was never identified.
The Bar Council felt, however, that "with some real effort, the soldier
who made the note could have been traced."
The missing men were never found. No accident was ever reported,
and Ashipemba's vehicle was never found.
The application for habeas corpus was eventually withdrawn. How-
ever, Mrs. Ashipemba and her sister, Mrs. Willibaldine Mapupa, subse-
quently sued the Security Police and the Minister for damages for
unlawfully arresting and detaining them while they were inquiring about
Mr. Ashipemba's disappearance:
In Oshakati Mrs Ashipemba learned that her husband had indeed
driven off in his car to meet her in Windhoek and that he had last been
seen at Oshivello. The two sisters therefore went to Oshivello, where they
made discreet inquiries.
When they inquired of police stationed at the Oshivello gate about
Mrs. Ashipemba's husband, they were told the police knew nothing
about the matter. However, the guard thereupon ordered them into a
police vehicle and drove them to Oshakati, where they were detained for
a month by the Security Police.
The defendants in the civil action said that they had detained the wo-
men under A-G 9, based on information-which they would not, how-
ever, divulge-that the sisters were SWAPO spies. The Security Police
explained that-although detention is authorized by A-G 9 for the pur-
pose of interrogation-they had never questioned the two detainees be-
cause they knew that the women would lie! The Bar Council concluded,
therefore, that the only purpose of detention was intimidation.
The plaintiffs accepted an offer to settle their suit for R 5000 [then
$2500], and the case was withdrawn.
In discussing the disappearance of Ashipemba and his passenger, the
memorandum concluded that "the only reasonable inference is that
Ashipemba and Nkanga had been killed by someone and their vehicle
destroyed."
151. Oshivello is the name of the hamlet where the paved road north from Windhoek
enters Ovamboland. All persons entering or leaving are cleared at the army checkpoint since
Ovamboland is under full martial law. See supra note 85. Security Council Resolution 435,
supra note 33, provides that 1500 South African troops may remain in Namibia, after the rest
are withdrawn, until the election has been held. These 1500 soldiers are to be confined to base
at Grootfontein (the army's main base, farther north) and/or Oshivello.
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This inference was strengthened by the Bar Council's "mention" of an
allegation made to two of its members by a lawyer for the respondent in
both Ashipemba cases: That lawyer had "heard" that the Security Forces
used an ex-SWAPO "terrorist" at the Oshivello gate to point out to the
Security Forces SWAPO "suspects" passing through the gate there. The
ex-terrorist was said to sit in a tent where he could see outside, but people
could not see him. According to the lawyer's account, a person who had
been fingered was allowed to pass through the gate, but 20 kilometers or
so beyond he was picked up by a vehicle or helicopter-"probably never
to be seen again."
The Bar Council offered to disclose to the Commission in confidence
the identity of the person who made these allegations and suggested that
he be subpoenaed to give evidence about them.
The Council noted that both Nakaua and Ashipemba were suspected
by the Security Police of opposition to the regime. It concluded that "the
grave suspicion is that Ashipemba, Nakaua and Nkanga were abducted
and murdered by people other than SWAPO and that there is a cover-up
of the true facts."]
It will be necessary for the Commission to attempt to find answers to
the questions left open in this case.
It will be interesting to establish whether any steps were taken by the
authorities to discipline the Security Police involved for the abuse of AG
9 of 1977 and the scandalous treatment meted out to two women who
needed sympathy and assistance for the loss of a husband and were in-
stead incarcerated by the very "protectors" of the community.
If not, it will only strengthen the suspicions of many that these prac-
tices carry the official approval of the government in high places.
9. The State v. Stephanus, Matthue and le Roux, Supreme Court of
S.W.A., 11 November 1982 is a case where a nativewoman of Owambo
was detained at the army camp and there raped by two black soldiers
after suggestion by the white sergeant.
Questions to be examined here are inter alia:
(i) Why was this woman detained and by whom?
(ii) What are the powers of army personnel to arrest and detain?
(iii) What rights and protection have detainees detained by members
of the army?
10. * * * [In S. v. Kruger and van der Heever152 the defendants were
charged with murder and armed robbery in Ovamboland.
152. S.W. Ar. Div., Feb. 11, 1983.
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According to the "undisputed facts," a group of Defence Force
soldiers, who had blackened faces and wore SWAPO or FAPLA15 3
uniforms, went to a kraal 154 and stole a four wheel drive vehicle. When
they were discovered by a black guard, they took him and the vehicle to
the army camp. There they burned the truck and shot the guard because
he was a witness.
The vehicle owner and employer of the guard was a headman, a mem-
ber of the Owambo Legislative Assembly, and a man of some influence.
When he complained, evidence of the crimes was discovered, and the
trial followed. The defendants were convicted of murder, but acquitted of
robbery when section 103ter of the Defence Act of 1957 was invoked.] 155
Some features of this case must be stressed:
(i) It demonstrates an abuse of Section 103ter and the need to amend it.
The minimum amendment required is the addition of the words "on
reasonable grounds" after the words "bonafide" and the scrapping of the
words "in connection with".156
(ii) The question is: how many cases never come to court because of the
existence of Section 103ter, which provides for absolute immunity for
members of the Security Forces whenever the deed is done bona fide for
the purpose of or in connection with the prevention or suppression of
terrorism in any operational area.
(iii) The mentality of many members of the Security Forces is here
demonstrated because although only two members were eventually
charged-a third volunteered to aid in the execution of the "kaffir" "ter-
rorist" when volunteers were openly called for this purpose in the army
pub.
Apparently none of the other members engaged in the robbery had any
objections.
(iv) The access by members of the Security Forces to SWAPO and
FAPLA uniforms and AK 47 rifles and the opportunities to commit
crimes in the name of SWAPO.1 57
153. FAPLA is the acronym for the Angolan government army.
154. A kraal is an enclosed area; by extension, it also refers to a family home consisting of
a group of huts surrounded by a hedge or wall of pales, brush, or similar material.
155. No. 44 of 1957, § 103ter.
156. This recommendation refers to subsection (2) of § 103ter, which reads:
No proceedings, whether civil or criminal, shall be instituted or continued in any court of
law against the State, the State President, the Minister [of Defence], a member of the
South African Defence Force or any other person in the service of the State by reason of
any act advised, commanded, ordered, directed or done in good faith by the State Presi-
dent, the Minister, or a member of the South African Defence Force for the purposes of
or in connection with the prevention or suppression of terrorism in any operational area.
157. According to Lubowski, supra note 81, at 18, the inquest into the death of Jona
Hamukwaya, see infra text accompanying notes 193-94, was the first judicial proceeding in
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11. In the [case of] State v. Diedericks and Cloete, S.W.A. Supreme
Court 13th April 1982, two members of the army doing duty in Owambo
were convicted on two charges of murder of a black civilian.
The accused were members of a group of soldiers who molested and
threatened civilians, detained two and eventually beat them to death.
One body was concealed in a stormwater drain and one covered under
leaves and branches. The one put into the stormwater drain was probably
still alive when pushed into the drain.
Here again two members were charged and convicted, but apparently
other members of the group did not discourage the accused.
12. * * * [S. v. du Plessis 58 involved a white member of the Defence
Force who took an army vehicle, a "Buffel", raped the wife of a promi-
nent shopowner, Mr. Eliazer Hambili, and destroyed Hambili's super-
market and bottle store with handgrenades. The damage allegedly ran
into hundreds of thousands of Rand.
Du Plessis was duly convicted, but the State refused to compensate
Hambili even though his life's work was totally destroyed.]
From information received, it appears that Mr. Hambili is regularly
detained under AG 9 of 1977.
It may be a coincidence but we submit that the reasons for this victim's
repeated detentions should be investigated.
The commission should also investigate the adequacy of provisions for
compensation to victims caused by crimes or malpractice of soldiers,
whether strictly acting in the execution of their duties or not.
F. [Special Police]
Time and space do not allow us to deal with the large number of so-
called "special police" and "home guards" 159 charged and convicted by
the Supreme Court for murder, culpable homicide, assault, rape, rob-
bery, malicious injury to property, etc.
It seems that "special police" are trained by the regular police forces to
hunt down and kill SWAPO insurgents. Often they are uneducated and
underdeveloped people with an inferiority complex and a lethal weapon
which it "was accepted as common cause that Koevoet is armed ... with ... a wide variety
of weapons of communist origin, notably AK 47"s," (emphasis in original) and that white mem-
bers of Koevoet do not wear regular service uniforms "while black members ofte [sic] wear
entirely civilian clothing." The purpose of wearing civilian clothing is clearly to cause the
victims of Koevoet atrocities to attribute them to SWAPO and thus to enable the authorities to
discredit SWATO in public opinion, particularly in the overseas press.
158. S.W.A. Sup. Ct., Apr. 13, 1982.
159. They include armed bodyguards attached to chiefs and other officials as well as
groups that have sprung up with even less plausible claims to authority.
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in hand. There is little control over the carrying of firearms and the near-
est they come to the profession of "policeman" is the name.
Again this policy has been the cause of many tragedies and the loss of
faith in the willingness and ability of the authorities to protect the citizen.
G. [Conclusion]
1. It is often claimed that [Namibian] law and order and the adminis-
tration of justice are in a healthy state.
People [who claim this] point to the cases that come before Court and
say: "There may be malpractices, but cases are investigated if complaints
are made and culprits [are] duly brought before the Court. Just look at
the cases heard before the Court."
2. This unfortunately is not the whole picture.
The true test is:
The number and extent of people killed, raped, robbed, assaulted, and
extorted that never come before the Court.
2.1. This question cannot be answered without investigation into the
number of people who disappear without trace; the number murdered by
unknown persons; the number who do not complain because of fear and
lack of trust in the institutions of justice; the cases where people are
killed and buried without investigation or inquest; the cases where people
are not prosecuted because of the shield provided by Section 103ter of the
Defence Act.
3. Submissions have been made as to laws to be reviewed as part of the
analysis of cases dealt with under "E" supra.
3.1. Some of the security laws applicable only to South West Africa
have not been dealt with specifically as no case relating to them has been
brought before our Courts.
One such law which, however, deserves further attention is AG 26 of
1978---"detention for the prevention of political violence and
intimidation." 160
We see no justification whatsoever for the wide powers of the Adminis-
trator/General, including indefinite detention without trial, the exclusion
of access to the Courts of Law and the failure to provide for compensa-
tion to a person so detained.
This law should be drastically amended.
3.2. In general we support the principle of consolidation of all security
laws applicable to South West Africa.
160. See Proc. AG 26, supra note 86.
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3.3. We also believe that in the special circumstances of South West
Africa, the death penalty should be abolished for all contraventions of
security laws.
3.4. In so far as legislation and practices of the R.S.A. are relevant and
applicable to S.W.A. our views co-incide substantially with those in the
publication entitled "Report on the Rabie Report" referred to in Section
"C" supra and we ask the Commission to deal with that report as an
integral part of our views and submissions.
4. In conclusion we submit:
4.1. Wide powers are often justified on the grounds of State Security
and directed at a particular enemy.
But if these powers and the abuse thereof remain unchecked, then no-
body will eventually be safe.
4.2. Most observers believe that our country is irrevocably on the road
to independence.
We believe that it will not be in the interest of Namibians and the new
state to inherit the present set of security laws. 161
4.3. Finally, in our respectful submission those laws in their present
form are inadequate, unfair and ineffective and may undermine internal
security rather than protect it.
[Signed by the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Treasurer of the Bar
Council]
161. The HNP memorandum submitted to the Commission of Inquiry, supra note 63, is
said to have given qualified support to existing security legislation as an emergency measure,
provided it is applied by a responsible government. "However," as the HNP secretary said in
an interview following submission of the document, "should the office of government revert to
a communist or power hungry group, the existing security legislation could become a threat
rather than a protection to the ordinary citizen." The Party nevertheless felt that there
"should be no hesitation to fight terror and communism with all the remedies available to the
state to prevent a communist regime from ever taking over in South West Africa." Windhoek
Observer, Nov. 10, 1984; see also Windhoek Advertiser, Nov 9, 1984.
The HNP memorandum opposed tapping telephones of peaceful opposition parties, as well
as other forms of political espionage and the use of radio or television "to abuse the rights of
lawful opponents." Windhoek Observer, Nov. 10, 1984.
The memorandum criticized Article 2 of a draft bill entitled "Combatting of Terrorism,"
which was proposed by the South African-sponsored "government" in 1981 asked that the
Commission of Inquiry not recommend its adoption. According to the HNP secretary, the
draft made a person committing an act with intent to impede or threaten the consitututional
development of the Territory guilty of "terrorism." This was so broad that it might apply to
members of his party for peaceably opposing Namibian independence. In fact, he added, the
bill "gave the impression as if it were aimed at right-wing political groups while under the
guise of combatting communism." Id.
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Annotator's Addendum
This addendum, written over a year and a half after the submission of
the Memorandum to the Commission of Inquiry, examines some of the
effects of the Bar Councils's efforts and fills in some facts known to local
lawyers in Namibia. It will also discuss some of the lessons the Memo-
randum offers and will include some developments which have occured
after the writing of the Memorandum.
The Bar Council's request for an inquiry into Namibian security legis-
lation was a cri de coeur.
Namibian lawyers, as a group and as individuals, are as conservative as
their counterparts elsewhere. Only one of their members claims to be a
member of SWAPO. 162 And as a leading firm of attorneys has discov-
ered, it can be dangerous to one's financial health to be too closely associ-
ated with the defense of political prisoners.163
Nevertheless, the Territory's advocates were driven to act by a combi-
nation of factors. These factors certainly included horror at the facts
lawyers had learned about the operation of security laws and security
forces in all parts of Namibia over many years; professional outrage at
executive interference with the judicial process; 164 shame aroused by ex-
ternal criticism; and quite possibly some attempt to position themselves
for the coming of an independent Namibian state.
162. That member is Anton Lubowski. He was drafted into the South African army in
1971 and until recently held a reserve officer's commission. It was withdrawn when he stated
that he considered it a duty, if called up, to fight for liberation with SWAPO rather than in the
South African Defence Force. RESISTER, Aug.-Sept. 1985, at 11.
163. Lorentz & Bone, which had done conveyancing for the City of Windhoek for many
years, lost its contract for future work. Ostensibly, the contract was taken away so that the
work could be rotated among all local attorneys. The common belief was that the action oc-
curred because of the firm's representation of political dissidents, as in Kauluma v. Minister of
Defence. Windhoek Advertiser, Oct. 25, 1984 at 1, col. 1; Windhoek Observer, Oct. 27, 1984
at 18, col. 1. A later chapter for Lorentz and Bone may be found in the story Scandalous
Attack by Shipanga, The Namibian, Feb. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 1. A member of the National
Assembly introduced a motion to investigate "anti-government organisations and persons."
Among the persons specifically mentioned by the Minister of Mines was David Smuts, a junior
partner in Lorentz & Bone. D. Smuts, Executive Interference in the Legal Process in Namibia
at 9 (paper delivered by Namibian attorney at the Seminar on the Legal Aspects of Apartheid
held in Washington D.C., July 6-7, 1985, under the co-sponsorship of the Southern Africa
Project of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the Section on Individual
Rights and Responsibilities and the Standing Committee on World Order under Law, of the
American Bar Association) (on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
164. Executive interference has included terminating a trial in progress, Kauluma v. Min-
ister of Defence, 184 (4) S.A. 59 (S.W. Afr. Sup. Ct.) (invoking § 103ter (4) of the Defence
Act); preventing the presentation of evidence, see the Kakuva case, supra text accompanying
note 129 (applying the "BOSS Act" to suppress investigation diaries); preventing certain
otherwise actionable claims from being litigated, see supra Memorandum § E.10 and note 56
(discussing S. v. Kruger and van der Heever and § 103ter (2) of the Defence Act); and denying
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A. Facts Known to Lawyers
Years earlier, members of the bar had become aware of many dis-
turbing facts. The Terrorism Act,165 enacted in 1967 to give the South
African government grounds to prosecute rebellious Namibians it had
detained several years earlier, provided for indefinite, incommunicado
detention and barred any recourse to the courts. Lawyers who defended
detainees subsequently brought to court knew to a moral certainty that
they had been tortured in detention. It was soon apparent that many of
these prisoners had been condemned before they ever were charged.
When a "satisfactory" confession had been extracted, the accused was
taken into court to be convicted pro forma and to present whatever evi-
dence he could in mitigation of his "offense." 166
Frequently, detention was not used to extract information, but to in-
timidate, to demonstrate who was boss, or to provide amusement for the
torturers. 167
When the Ovambo chiefs began publicly whipping SWAPO supporters
in the early 1970's, at least some lawyers knew, as the Memorandum
points out in cautiously circumspect language, 168 that the Security Police
(presumably with the approval of Pretoria and its Administrator) had
encouraged the chiefs and delivered selected victims to them. Certainly,
when the chiefs' actions were protested to the (South African) Minister
of Bantu Administration and Development, 169 the Minister refused to
criticize, let alone act. He claimed that according to the Native Nations
Act,' 70 the ethnic authority was solely responsible.' 7 '
The churches are the best informed group in Namibia about what goes
on in the "homelands" and particularly in the "operational area," where
pastors and laity alike suffer from the ruthless application of security
legislation.' 72 Church leaders have repeatedly sought some sort of legal
access to the courts, see, eg., the Terrorism Act, No. 83 of 1967, § 6. See Smuts, supra note
163, at 9.
165. No. 183 of 1967, supra note 76.
166. See Dugard, Criminal Procedure, 1967 ANN. SuRv. S. AFR. L. 327-30 (describing § 6
of the Terrorism Act).
167. Hair Trigger Justice, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 16, 1985, at 25.
168. See supra Memorandum § E.1, text accompanying notes 123-25.
169. This official was formerly called, and is referred to in the Memorandum as, the Minis-
ter of Native Affairs.
170. See supra notes 23, 88.
171. Ermacora, Flogging in Namibia, 9 HUM. Rars. J. 354, 355 (1976); see also Landis,
Namibia and Human Rights, 9 HUM. RTs. J. 283, 289 (1976).
172. A survey of Namibian clergy and laity attending a Lutheran synod in 1982 revealed
that 17% of them had been detained at least once by security forces and that most of those
detained had been tortured. Campaign to Abolish Torture, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA,
BULL. No. 5 (Summer 1985), at 3.
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relief to protect their parishioners. 173 Much of their information, even
when not relevant to existing or contemplated legal proceedings, is
shared with the most concerned members of the bar.
The information that aroused legal ire, horror, dismay, and/or shame
could, however, seldom be used in court. 174 On the rare occasions when
it could, and when the courts upheld the victims' rights, the outcome
seemed to have little or no effect on the subsequent conduct of the Secur-
ity Forces. 175
B. The Call for a Commission of Inquiry
It seemed to the Bar Council that a commission of inquiry, if ap-
pointed, would give the bar a forum in which to exercise their powers of
persuasion on both the public and officials. No doubt there lingered the
hope that the "truth," if exposed, would have to affect the authorities. It
would not be surprising if there were a small element of "graymail" as
well in the request for an official inquiry. Pretoria, in trying to sell its
proposed constitutional reform in South Africa, would prefer a judicial
inquiry, rather than a public expose to the foreign press by prominent
lawyers disturbed about the situation in Namibia. In addition, the bar
must have hoped to influence the legal structure of the new Namibian
government, whenever it should come into existence. 76 The excesses of
the occupation regime should not become the norm for new governors,
who would undoubtedly learn more by example than by textbook theory.
In any case, it seems certain that a legal system as rigidly circumscribed
as is the Namibian legal system did not suggest many other possibilities
of reform. Without some method of addressing grievous wrongs, it
would become increasingly difficult to argue against extralegal activities.
173. Some examples of church leaders' actions are the attempt to enjoin whipping of polit-
ical dissidents, see supra Memorandum § E.1, and the application to release the detainees from
Kassinga held near Mariental, see supra note 119.
174. People are too poor, ignorant, afraid, and far away from lawyers to seek relief; the
relevant prescriptive periods are too short, often expiring before the facts are known; and exec-
utive interference, see supra note 164, prevents many cases from being effectively prosecuted.
In addition, cases which could set precedents, e.g., the Ashipemba case, discussed supra Memo-
randum § E.8., and the Hamukwaya case, infra text accompanying note 194, are frequently
settled out of court without any ruling on the conduct of the Security Forces.
175. See D. Smuts, supra note 163. Smuts points out that the captain of the Security Police
involved in infiltrating the law firm representing the defendants in S. v. Mushimba, see supra
Memorandum § E. 6, has now been promoted to colonel. See also S. v. Nagel, supra Memo-
randum § E.4, regarding testimony of the officer in charge, who said that he would like the
defendant, convicted of murder, back in his unit despite his crime.
176. The authors of the Memorandum state in § G.4.2 that it is generally believed that
Namibia is "irrevocably" on the road to independence.
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When it became apparent that the Bar Council would continue to de-
mand, possibly publicly, an inquiry, the Administrator-General finally
established a commission. But he took care to keep control of the situa-
tion, behind a facade of responding to the lawyers' requests. The terms
of reference, "to inquire into. . . and make recommendations as to the
internal security of the said territory," 177 appeared responsive to the Bar
Council's concerns. In fact, however, they did not meet the Council's
objective of examining shortcomings and abuses in the application of ex-
isting security laws.' 78
While the leaders of the Society of Advocates urged the appointment
of black Africans (who, after all, are the victims of most security law
abuses) to the Commission, the Administrator-General loaded the Com-
mission with white South Africans and civil servants. 179 Two (white)
Namibians, apparently in private practice, would have to represent terri-
torial opinion. Their presence could be useful, of course, to diffuse the
blame if the Commission's conclusions should be subject to criticism.
It was obvious to the lawyers, as it was to the churches, that such a
commission, operating as prescribed, was unlikely to achieve what the
Bar Council had hoped. But, having called for its creation and unwilling
to leave the field to those who called for stronger security legislation,
they must have felt that they had little choice but to present testimony.
They were allowed to make an oral presentation and submit the Memo-
randum, but the hearings themselves were held in camera.
C. The Memorandum
Undoubtedly, the Commission's restrictive terms of reference, and the
unsatisfactory regulations as to its functioning, 80 affected the Memoran-
dum. The Bar Council was also bound by the very strict sub judice rule
that applies in Namibia. This rule severely restricts discussion of cases
still before a court. The cases that the Council discussed in most detail in
the Memorandum are those that had been reported at length in the pub-
lic press.181
177. See supra note 98.
178. See supra text accompanying note 98.
179. See supra note 103. The posts of the listed members indicate that the members of the
Commission are white.
180. See supra text accompanying note 101.
181. See Wood v. Ondangwa Tribal Authority, Memorandum, supra § E. 1, and text ac-
companying note 123; Kakuva v. Administrator-General, Memorandum, supra § E. 2, text
accompanying note 129; S. v. Paulua and Matheus, Memorandum, supra § E.4, text accompa-
nying note 143; and Ashipemba v. Minsiter of Police, Memorandum supra § E.8.
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In October, 1984, the Bar Council submitted a supplementary memo-
randum, which has not been made public. In all likelihood, it contains
materials (from one or more cases) that are not part of the public record.
According to a Namibian lawyer, 182 the supplementary memorandum re-
fers to persons in power who brand critics or complainants as traitors,
and to an attack on the Bar Council by the South African Minister of
Police. 183
The Memorandum was drafted very quickly after the decision was
made to present evidence to the Commission of Inquiry. Apart from a
recapitulation of the Bar Council's criticism of the Commission's terms
of reference,18 4 the document itself may be divided into two parts: a
summary of decided cases, with recommendations growing out of them
(Section E); and general considerations and recommendations (Sections
C, D, F, and G). The differences between these two parts are striking.
Section E presents a rough cross-section of the kinds of cases involving
abuse of security legislation that have come before the courts. Both the
commentary on the cases and the further comments in Section G.2 make
it obvious that most instances of abuse remain unknown or untriable.1 85
The numerous accounts of intimidation and harassment of victims and
investigators, of failure to keep records of detention or of the destruction
of those records, and of executive interference with the judicial pro-
cess,186 give insight into the ways a sophisticated regime controls the ad-
ministration of justice without using the crude tools of assassination and
"disappearances" against members of the legal profession (at least not
against the white members of the profession). 187 At the same time, the
accounts of the treatment of black victims demonstrate the depths of ra-
cism among the occupiers and the manner in which it is manifested
against a population that universally rejects the occupiers' claim to
govern.
In general, the recommendations interspersed throughout Section E,
whether explicit or implict in the form of questions, are more pointed
and more forceful than those made in the other sections. They seem to
gain in urgency by being placed in the context that gives rise to them.
182. See D. Smuts, supra note 163.
183. This attack may be related to the complaint made to the South Africa Media Council.
See supra note 141.
184. Memorandum, §§ A & B (omitted from the Memorandum as reproduced supra, but
on file with the Yale Journal of International Law).
185. See supra note 163.
186. Id.
187. Hosea Angula, a black attorney practicing in Windhoek, indicates that his profession
did not protect him from harassment and detention. See H. Angula, supra note 87, at 6.
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Even so, many of the recommendations are cautious: for example, give
the courts power to "override the decisions of the executive [to bar evi-
dence] in certain circumstances."'18 8 The recommendation that AG 9 be
amended to provide for detention "only for the purpose of interrogation
and not for indefinite detention without trial" 189 is unrealistic and avoids
criticizing detention without trial, whatever the purpose. In addition, the
recommendation in Section G.3.3, to abolish the death penalty in
Namibia, while radical for South Africa, is not unprecedented in
Namibia. A Namibian court decided against sentencing a SWAPO guer-
rilla to death on the ground that execution would not act as a deterrent
in Namibia and might in fact convert the defendant into a popular
martyr. 190
D. Recent Developments
Since the Bar Council drafted its memorandum, the decisions in two
cases discussed in Section E that were then on appeal have been af-
firmed. 191 Namibian political prisoners serving life or long term
sentences on Robben Island (a jail for "politicals" in the harbor off Cape
Town) have been returned to Windhoek and released.192
A number of new cases, some as significant as those discussed in the
Memorandum, have been brought before the Namibian Supreme Court.
In Nestor v. Minister of Police193 conditions of detention, while less hori-
fying than the worst instances cited in the Kakuva case, were neverthe-
less held unacceptable. The detainees were held, blindfolded and
chained, in tiny cells hardly big enough to lie down in, without adequate
air circulation, and were denied the right to exercise.
In 1983, a Kavango schoolteacher, Jona Hamukwaya, was arrested by
members of Koevoet and died shortly thereafter in their custody. The
court, which had before it affidavits from others detained with him as to
the tortures they suffered, found that he died in detention as the result of
unlawful conduct by Koevoet members.194 His widow, joined by detain-
ees who survived the ordeal, sued the Minister of Police. On January 22,
188. Memorandum, supra § E.2, text accompanying note 132 (emphasis added).
189. Memorandum, supra § E.2, text accompanying note 138.
190. See State v. Muvala [or Muawala, Muaala, Mawaala, Awaala], Memorandum, supra
§ D.2.2, text accompanying note 121, discussed in Windhoek Observer, May 28, 1983, at 37,
col. 3; Windhoek Observer, May 27, 1983, at 3, col. 5.
191. U. Kakuva and Another v. Administrator-General and Minister of Police, appeal
dismissed, see Windhoek Observer, December 15, 1984; State v. Paulus and Matheus, sentence
aifid, see Windhoek Observer, Sept. 29, 1984, at 11, col. 1.
192. The Namibian, Nov. 15, 1985, at 3, col. 1; The Namibian, Nov. 22, 1985, at 7, col. 1.
193. 1984 (4) S.A. 230 (S.W. Afr. Sup. Ct.); see also A. Lubowski, supra note 81, at 14-25.
194. See IDAF Focus, May-June 1985, at 4.
Yale Journal of International Law
1985 an out-of-court settlement was reached, with R58,000 (then
$45,000) awarded to Mrs. Hamukwaya and R30,701 ($23,000) to be
shared among the other plaintiffs. 195
The Hamukwaya case is also believed to have figured indirectly in the
dismissal of a criminal prosecution brought in South Africa against Ro-
man Catholic Archbishop Dennis Hurley of the diocese of Natal. He
was charged under the Police Act 196 with publishing "false matter"
about the police when he referred in a press conference and public state-
ments to atrocities committed by Koevoet in Namibia, based on the re-
port of the South African Catholic Bishops' Conference. 197 Hurley's
response was to warn that a "lot of dirt"-believed to include promi-
nently the facts of the Hamukwaya case-would come out at his trial.
On the date set for the trial the charges were dismissed on technical
grounds. The Archbishop professed himself disappointed that "what the
trial could have brought out was not brought out."'198
A number of Namibian lawyers indicated in private conversations dur-
ing the past year that the territorial Supreme Court, apparently reflecting
recent changes in personnel, seemed more responsive to human rights
concerns than it had been previously. In the summer of 1985, the territo-
rial Supreme Court upheld the application of Nikodemus Katofa, himself
a former Mariental detainee, 199 for the right of his brother, Josef Katofa,
who was detained under Proclamation AG 26,200 to have access to a law-
yer and to be released.20 1 The Court granted the first part of Nikodemus
Katofa's petition, holding that the Proclamation did not deny access to
lawyers. The Court then considered the affidavit of the Chairman of the
Cabinet of the newly installed government 20 2 to the effect that he was
"satisfied" that the continued detention of Josef Katofa was in the inter-
est of state security. The Court held that it was not satisfied by an affida-
vit that adduced no reasons for the Minister's conclusions, and ordered
Katofa's release.20 3
195. Windhoek Advertiser, Jan. 28, 1985, at 3.
196. No. 7 of 1958.
197. SOUTH AFRICAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS' CONFERENCE, REPORT ON NAMIBIA, May 12,
1982 (copy on file with annotator).
198. Wash. Post, Feb. 19, 1985, at A14, col. 6.
199. Seesupra notes 119, 136.
200. See supra note 86 & Memorandum, § G.3.1.
201. The Namibian, Aug. 30, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
202. See supra text accompanying note 52. See also IDAF Focus, Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 9
(summary of Katofa case).
203. In the Matter between the Cabinet of the Interim Government for South West Africa
and the Officer Commanding Windhoek Prison and Nikodemus Katofa, affirming rule nisi
issued on June 20, 1985, reported in Windhoek Advertiser, Aug. 27, 1985, at 3, col. 1. This
case was begun against the Administrator-General and Commanding Officer as respondents
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However, more recently there has been some murmuring (as yet
largely sotto voce) among lawyers that the Katofa decision may have been
a fluke, or perhaps the high-water mark of a tide now receding.
A maneuver by Namibia's "interim government," installed by Preto-
ria, has undoubtedly had its influence: The Constitutional Council
Act,2°4 adopted by the new National Assembly to provide for the draft-
ing of a constitution for a future Namibian state, required that the chair-
man of the Council be a judge or former judge. A faction of the
"cabinet" persuaded the Administrator-General to name a lawyer in the
South African Department of Justice as a sixth judge of the South West
Africa Supreme Court in order to qualify him as chairman of the Coun-
cil, a position to which he was immediately named. After a major flap,205
the lawyer was persuaded to withdraw, and the "cabinet" agreed, in-
stead, on the former Judge President of the Transvaal Supreme Court,
who had been serving as seconded Chief Justice of the allegedly in-
dependent state of Bophuthatswana.20 6 This use of judicial appointment
for political purposes was certainly not designed to encourage judicial
independence.
Any possible liberalization in the Supreme Court has not carried over
to the magistrates, who conduct the actual inquests. Thus, for example,
on January 17, 1985, the Windhoek Advertiser reported the finding of an
inquest court that there was insufficient evidence to hold anyone crimi-
nally liable for a death, allegedly by assault, that had occurred in
Kavango the year before. The evidence, according to the news story,
showed that on Febkuary 18, 1984, an eight-year-old boy was playing
near the victim's hut when a Casspir armored vehicle arrived. The arti-
cle stated that "[flour Koevoet Policemen dragged Mr. Kashe [the vic-
tim] from his hut about 50 metres into the bush. The boy saw one of the
men striking Mr. Kashe to the ground and kicking him in the stomach
when he stood up." Kashe's common-law wife stated that he had been in
good health when she left in the morning; but when she returned, he
could not eat and complained of pain. The news story quoted her as
saying "[h]is face and stomach were swollen and there were abrasions on
his abdomen." He died soon after in a clinic. 20 7
(later respondents-appellants), but the Cabinet of the newly installed government was eventu-
ally substituted for the Administrator-General. See IDAF Focus, Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 9.
204. See IDAF Focus, Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 10.
205. Windhoek Observer, Apr. 12, 1984.
206. IDAF Focus, Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 11.
207. Windhoek Advertiser, Jan. 17, 1985.
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Similarly, when six soldiers under the command of a rifleman fired a
hail of bullets at a truck, killing the black driver, the magistrate at the
inquest ruled no one was criminally liable for the death. 20 8
The name of Koevoet was changed to COIN, the acronym for
"Counter Insurgency Unit," when it was put under the command of the
Commissioner of South West Africa Police, on May 1, 1985.209 The old
name continues to be used in popular parlance, however, and there ap-
pears to be no change in its functioning.2 10
E. Bar Council Accomplishments
Insofar as the Bar Council sought real changes in existing security leg-
islation and in its application, the establishment of the Commission of
Inquiry and the representations made to the Commission on behalf of the
Society of Advocates would appear to be a failure. The Commission has
not yet issued any findings, and as of December 6, 1985, there was no
indication as to whether or when it would. 21'
The new Namibian "government" has shown no interest in repealing
or even reforming security legislation. Although it was created by a
proclamation212 that contained a "Bill of Fundamental Rights and
Objectives," barring arbitrary arrest and detention, 213 the Chairman of
the Cabinet completely ignored this provision in the Katofa case when he
insisted on continuing detention without trial.214 Since then, the interim
government's Minister of Justice has announced that the government in-
tends to retain AG 9.215
208. Id.
209. COIN is reported to have a strength of around 1000. The organization consists
mainly of black Namibian police officers, recruited from the ranks of special constables, and
commanded by white South African police or mercenaries (many of the latter former Rhode-
sian Selous Scouts). It has groups based at Opuwe (where Kakuva was detained), at Oshakati
in Ovamboland (its headquarters), and at Rundu, the capital of Kavango. COIN is one of
several elite, specialized, and highly secret police and military units in northern Namibia that
are referred to collectively as Special Forces. They include, in addition, the 32 Buffalo Battal-
ion, based in Rundu, which operates almost entirely in Angola; the South West Africa Special
Task Force; and the South West Africa Specialists, the latter two being engaged primarily in
frontline operations. See S. v. Nagel, Memorandum, supra § E.4; IDAF Focus, Nov.-Dec.
1985, at 11.
210. See IDAF Focus, Nov.-Dec. 1985, at 11.
211. The Namibian, Dec. 6, 1985, at 8, col. 2 (interview with Minister of Justice of interim
government installed on June 17, 1985).
212. See South West Africa Legislative and Executive Authority Establishment Proclama-
tion, supra note 52.
213. Id. at Annexure 1, art. 2, para. 1.
214. Applicant's lawyers cited the Bill of Fundamental Rights, id., in arguing for Katofa's
release.
215. The Namibian, Dec. 6, 1985, at 8, col. 2. The Minister of Justice suggested that to
remove Proc. AG 9 would adversely affect the morale of the police. Id.
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Atrocities continue unabated. The Catholic Bishops' Conference has
recently released a new report on another tour of Namibia, undertaken as
part of an ecumenical delegation in October 1984. This report contains
allegations concerning new killings and assaults similar to those referred
to in the 1982 report.2 16 The Namibian press continues to report atroci-
ties in every issue,2 17 and the Lutheran Bishop of the North has pleaded
for an end to the killings, which he claims are destroying his people.2 18
Amnesty International's latest bulletin on Namibia21 9 recites one of
the most grisly stories of torture in the Territory: two security agents
beat 63-year old Ndara Kapitango, a political detainee, then roasted him
alive over an open fire. He was so severely burned that he required
lengthy hospitalization, and one arm had to be amputated. According to
news from Namibia, he has since died. A military tribunal fined the
soldiers R50 each (less than $25 at the time) for their excessive zeal.220 It
is assumed that they appear in the statistics as military personnel pun-
ished for mistreating the local populace.
Amnesty International also cited the then-current case of Thomas
Nikanor, who died in a detention center at Ondangua, allegedly by
"hanging himself with his socks." The authorities indicated that they
did not intend to conduct an inquest into his death.22 1 When they finally
yielded to the demands for an official inquiry, the body, which had been
in their keeping since the purported suicide, was too decomposed for
either the state pathologist or the family's expert to determine the cause
of death. 222 Another technique for thwarting justice.
The number of Namibians known to be in detention varies from
around thirty to sixty or more, depending on the events of the
216. Windhoek Advertiser, Jan. 28, 1985.
217. See, e.g., The Namibian, Dec. 6, 1985, at 8, col. 2. The lead story in this issue of The
Namibian reported the death of Frans Uapota, "allegedly beaten to death by soldiers of the
South African Defence Force" the preceding Thursday. "They attacked my husband like a
pack of wild dogs," his wife claimed. Hardly a week passes without one or more similar
reports issued by the Namibian Communications Centre in London.
218. Namibian Bishop Calls for 'Quick Steps' to Free His Country, Namibian Communica-
tions Centre, Sept. 18, 1985.
219. Campaign to Abolish Torture, supra note 172, at 1.
220. Id.; Windhoek Advertiser, Feb. 27, 1984.
221. Campaign to Abolish Torture, supra note 172, at 4. Eventually, one session of an
inquest court was held, but further sessions were postponed for three months. See South Afri-
can Inquest into Death in Detention Adjourned; Cause of Death Called 'Inconclusive.' Namibian
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moment.223 The Minister of Justice in the transitional government was
recently reported as stating that there were some fifty in detention as far
as he knew.224 Since the population of Namibia is roughly one-twentieth
that of South Africa, the number of detentions in the Territory is
equivalent to some 600-1200 detained in the Republic-about the
number of those held in South Africa under the present state of
emergency.
The ban on travel to the north without a police permit has been used
to make it impossible to follow reports on atrocities. 225 Thus, a lawyer
appointed by the Roman Catholic Church to investigate seven bodies
found in a shallow ditch near a police base in the "operational area" was
unable to act because he was refused a permit.226 Similarly, the indefati-
gable Hans Rohr227 has finally been stopped from investigating alleged
atrocities in the Kavango area by being denied a pass.228 Over a period
of years he had reported, with attendant publicity, dozens of shocking
cases, many attested by affidavits and photos. Few resulted in court pro-
ceedings, however, or in disciplinary actions against their perpetrators.
Despite the Bar Council's failure to achieve its primary objectives, the
exercise has nevertheless not been in vain. It has forced the legal profes-
sion, including those who have steered clear of "political" cases, to look
at the security legislation in the Territory and to take a stand on it-
however cautious. It has provided some human rights guidelines-how-
ever limited-for a government of a future independent Namibia.
The Bar Council has, moreover, helped to establish the credentials of
the legal profession so that its advice may be considered after indepen-
dence, and so that it will have moral standing to challenge any violations
of human rights if they occur under a new government. Further, it has
accumulated considerable evidence concerning specific unpunished viola-
tors of human rights (and of Namibian laws). Such evidence may be
used in criminal or civil proceedings at some future date in Namibia and/
223. From time to time lists are compiled and issued by any or all of the following, who
freely share information: Episcopal Churchpeople for a Free Southern Africa, New York,
N.Y.; NCC, London; Amnesty International, London and United States; IDAF, London; and
the Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights under Law, Washing-
ton, D.C.
224. The Namibian, Dec. 6, 1985, at 8, col 2. The Minister of Justice made it clear that
the South West Africa Security Forces, which are under nominal Namibian control, are not, in
fact, accountable to the interim government.
225. See supra note 87.
226. RESISTER, Aug.-Sept. 1985, at 9.
227. Mr. Rohr has been leader of the small Namibian Christian Democratic Party.
228. RESISTER, Aug.-Sept. 1985, at 9.
Vol. 11:48, 1985
Security Legislation in Namibia
or South Africa, similar, perhaps, to those now occurring in
Argentina.229
Finally, the Memorandum has provided foreign lawyers and policy-
makers with substantiated information concerning the true situation in
Namibia. If this information is factored into the considerations guiding
other states' policy towards Sourth Africa, Namibia, and the rest of
southern Africa, the resulting decisions ultimately may be more realistic
and wiser.
229. See Mignone, Estlund, Issacharoff, Dictatorship on Trial: Human Rights Violation in
Argentina, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 118 (1984).
